[ G.R. NO. 4386, FEBRUARY 24, 1909 ]
CHANG
YONG TEK, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GENEROSA SANTOS, DEFENDANT
AND APPELLANT.
FACTS:
The plaintiff sold to the defendant a certain quantity of
tobacco, amounting in all to the sum of P894, P442
of the said amount was to be paid at the end of January, 1904, and that P452 of
said amount was to be paid at the end of the month of September, 1905. No
part of the said amount of P894 having been paid, the plaintiff commenced an
action on the 24th of January, 1907, for its recovery.
The only defense presented by the defendant was that the
tobacco delivered by the plaintiff was not of good quality.The record does not
show that the defendant had made any complaint to the plaintiff concerning the
quality of the tobacco or that it was not the kind of tobacco which she had
purchased, until after the present action had been commenced. Neither does the
record disclose that the plaintiff made any false representations with
reference to the quality or kind of tobacco sold. There is no
attempt to show that the plaintiff
undertook to warrant the quality of the tobacco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the buyer is liable for the price of the
thing delivered?
RULING:
In the absence of an express warranty, a vendor of
merchandise only warrants;
First. The legal and peaceable possession of the thing sold; and
Second. That there are no hidden faults or defects therein. (Art. 1474, Civil Code.)
First. The legal and peaceable possession of the thing sold; and
Second. That there are no hidden faults or defects therein. (Art. 1474, Civil Code.)
It not being proven that the plaintiff made any warranty or any
misrepresentations with reference to the quality of the tobacco in question,
and it having been proven that the defendant had an opportunity to and did
examine the tobacco in question at the time of purchase and not having made any
objection whatever' until after a lapse of more than three years and not then
until after an action had been brought, and making no objection whatever as to
the price agreed upon, nor as to the quantity of the tobacco delivered, in our
opinion she should be held liable for the payment of the amount agreed upon.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 81541, OCTOBER 04, 1989 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, PRESIDED BY HON. JUDGE RICARTE M. TOGONON AND APOLINARIO BATACLAN, JULIA BATACLAN, FRANCISCO SAGUILAYAN, ZENAIDA P. BATACLAN, FRANCISCA BATACLAN, NAPOLEON BATACLAN, LILIBETH BATACLAN AND ELEAZAR BATACLAN, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On September
20, 1980, the private respondents sold several parcels of land located in
Dasmariñas, Cavite, in favor of Ricardo Silverio. These parcels were at that
time registered in the names of the private respondents. One of the parcels,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-110942 of the Registry of Deeds
for the province of Cavite, is the subject matter of a litigation between the
private respondents and Pedro Caragao and his co-owners for reconveyance and
cancellation of title and damages. Pedro Caragao then caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original of the Transfer Certificate of Title
(T.C.T.) of the parcel of land under litigation, on file in the Register of
Deeds for the province of Cavite, without the knowledge of the private
respondents. Hence, the owners’ (private respondents') copy of the title in
question did not bear any annotation of such notice of lis pendens.
When the private
respondents sold the two parcels of land to Silverio, including the one under
litigation for reconveyance between Caragao and the private respondents, they
warranted that the properties are "free from all liens and encumbrances
whatsoever."
On the basis of this express warranty vis-a-vis the notice of lis pendens duly annotated at the back of the
original of the Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.-110942) on file in the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite. Assistant Fiscal Napoleon V.
Dilao of the City of Manila filed an information for "Falsification of
Public Document" against the private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a
notice of lis pendens is a lien or encumbrance within the
contemplation of criminal law, in particular, the crime of
falsification of public document?
RULING:
Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 14, Section 24, thus:
SEC. 24. Notice of lis pendens.-- In an action affecting the title
or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff, at the time of
filing the complaint, and the defendant, at the time of filing his answer, when
affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time afterwards, may
record in the office of the registrar of deeds of the province in which the
property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the
names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description
of the property in that province affected thereby. From the time only of filing
such notice for record shall a purchaser, or incumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real
names.
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit[12] or a pending litigation while a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real
property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on
the result of the litigation over the said property.[13] It is but a signal to the intending buyer or mortgagee to take
care or beware and to investigate the prospect or non-prospect of the
litigation succeeding before he forks down his money.
Notice of Lis pendens has been conceived and, more often than not, availed of, to
protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights
is pending resolution or decision. With the notice of lis pendens duly recorded, and remains uncancelled, he could rest secure
that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation.
"[T]he
doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public
policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment or the decree shall
have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation,
its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of
execution."[14] The lower court is therefore correct in ruling that a notice of lis pendens being a mere cautionary notice to a prospective buyer or
mortgagee of a parcel of land under litigation, then it imposes no obligation
on the owner, but on the prospective buyer. It cannot conceivably be the “lien
or encumbrance” contemplated by law.
On the
other hand, a "lien" is a charge on property usually for the payment
of some debt or obligation.[15] A “lien” is a qualified right or a proprietary interest, which
may be exercised over the property of another. It is a right which the law
gives to have a debt satisfied out of a particular thing.[16] It signifies a legal claim or charge on property, either real or
personal, as a collateral or security for the payment of some debt or
obligation.
Similarly,
an "encumbrance is a burden upon land, depreciative of its value, such as
a lien, easement, or servitude, which, though adverse to (the) interest of
(the) landowner, does not conflict with his conveyance of (the) land in
fee."[17]
The
following are considered encumbrances: A claim, lien, charge, or liability
attached to and binding real property; e.g., a mortgage, judgment lien, lease,
security interest, easement or right of way, accrued and unpaid taxes.[18] A lien is already an existing burden or charge on the property while a notice
of lis pendens, as the very term connotes, is only a notice or warning that a claim or possible
charge on the
property is pending determination by the court.
Consequently, the
effect of a notice of lis pendens is not to
establish an actual lien on the property affected. All that it does is to give
notice to third persons and to the whole world that any interest they may
acquire in the property pending litigation will be subject to the eventuality
or result of the suit. It follows to reason, therefore, that the mere failure
to state in a public document, as a notarized deed of sale, the existence of a
notice of lis pendens does not constitute falsification of a public
document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. This is specially true in
the case at bar because the notice of lis
pendens is annotated only at
the back of the original of the T.C.T. in the Registry of Deeds; it does not
appear at the back of the owner's copy of the same T.C.T. Be that as it
may, not all claims against a property can be considered a lien within the
contemplation of law. First, such claims must be in satisfaction of some debt
or performance of an act under a contract. Second, the legal right to
enforce such payment or performance of an act be anchored on an existing or
demandable obligation and not merely dependent upon the result of a pending
litigation where the claims of the parties are not yet finally determined. Such
claims in a pending litigation only ripen to a "lien" within the
contemplation of law when there is already a valid judgment rendered because
then it becomes a judgment or judicial lien.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed
by respondent court, the petition is hereby DISMISSED,
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