ellis report

G.R. No. 107797, August 26, 1996

SALVATIERRA VS. CA

FACTS:

            Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was survived by his legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and sister Marcela. His estate consisted of three parcels of land.

An Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and descendants of Enrique Salvatierra, which consisted of Lot No. 25, 26 and 27. By virtue of the sale executed by Marcela in favor of Venancio, the latter now owns 2/5 shares of the estate. By virtue of the sale by Bartolome’s heirs Catalina and Ignacia, of his undivided shares to Tomas, now deceased, represented by his widow, Catalina Azarcon, the latter now owns 2/5 shares in the said estate. Anselmo Salvatierra represented his father Macario, who had already died.

Thereafter, Venancio sold the whole of Lot No. 27 and a 149-sq. m. portion of Lot 26 to herein respondent spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. The Longalongs took possession of the said lots. It was discovered in 1982 (through a relocation survey) that the 149 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 26 was outside their fence. It turned out that Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a title, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-4221 in his name, the title covering the whole of Lot. No. 26 which has an area of 749 sq. m.

Private respondents Longalong then filed a case with the RTC for the reconveyance of the said portion of Lot 26.

ISSUES:

1.      Whether or not there was a double sale.

2.      Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail, Art. 1391 of the New Civil Code which limits the filing of actions to four (4) years or Art. 1144 of the same Code which limits the period of the filing of actions on certain grounds to ten years?

RULING:

Petitioners rely on the theory that this is a case of double sale case of Lot No. 26 to both petitioners and respondents Longalong, et. al. A perusal of the records and evidence, reveals otherwise. Both parties did not dispute the existence and contents of the Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale, as both presented them as their respective exhibits. The parties may not have realized it, but the deciding factor of this dispute is this very document itself. It is very clear therein that Macario Salvatierra’s share in the estate of the deceased Enrique Salvatierra is only 405 sq. m. out of the 749 sq. m. comprising Lot No. 26. Since Venancio Salvatierra, under this document, is to get a portion of Lot No. 26 in addition to Lot No. 27, then it follows that Venancio is entitled to the remaining 344 sq. m. of Lot No. 26, after deducting the 405 sq. m. share of Macario.      

The applicable provision in the case at bar is Art. 1144 of the New Civil.  Art. 1391 of the same code, referred to by petitioners is not in point. This article must be read in conjunction with Art. 1390 which refers to voidable contracts. This case at hand involves fraud committed by petitioner Anselmo Salvatierra in registering the whole of Lot No. 26 in his name, with evident bad faith. In effect, an implied trust was created by virtue of Art. 1456.

In this connection, we hold that an action for reconveyance of registered land based on an implied trust may be barred by laches. The prescriptive period for such actions is ten (10) years from the date the right of action accrued. The complaint for reconveyance was filed by the Longalong spouses on November 22, 1985, only five (5) years after the issuance of the O.C.T. No. 0-4221 over Lot No. 26 in the name of Anselmo Salvatierra. Hence prescription has not yet set in.

G.R. NO. 124242, January 21, 2005

SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. CA

FACTS:

On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold the two parcels of land to respondent Pablo Babasanta. The latter made a downpayment of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as evidenced by a memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu of the same date. Several other payments totaling two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) were made by Babasanta. He demanded the execution of a Final Deed of Sale in his favor so he may effect full payment of the purchase price; however, the spouses declined to push through with the sale.  They claimed that when he requested for a discount and they refused, he rescinded the agreement. Thus, Babasanta filed a case for Specific Performance.

On the other hand, San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) alleged that on 3 May 1989, the two parcels of land involved, namely Lot 1764-A and 1764-B, had been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it was a buyer in good faith and for value and therefore it had a better right over the property in litigation.

ISSUE:

Who between SLDC and Babasanta has a better right over the two parcels of land?

RULING:

An analysis of the facts obtaining in this case, as well as the evidence presented by the parties, irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the agreement between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale.

The receipt signed by Pacita Lu merely states that she accepted the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) from Babasanta as partial payment of 3.6 hectares of farm lot. While there is no stipulation that the seller reserves the ownership of the property until full payment of the price which is a distinguishing feature of a contract to sell, the subsequent acts of the parties convince us that the Spouses Lu never intended to transfer ownership to Babasanta except upon full payment of the purchase price.

Babasanta’s letter dated 22 May 1989 was quite telling. He stated therein that despite his repeated requests for the execution of the final deed of sale in his favor so that he could effect full payment of the price, Pacita Lu allegedly refused to do so.  In effect, Babasanta himself recognized that ownership of the property would not be transferred to him until such time as he shall have effected full payment of the price. Doubtlessly, the receipt signed by Pacita Lu should legally be considered as a perfected contract to sell.

The perfected contract to sell imposed upon Babasanta the obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. There being an obligation to pay the price, Babasanta should have made the proper tender of payment and consignation of the price in court as required by law.  Glaringly absent from the records is any indication that Babasanta even attempted to make the proper consignation of the amounts due, thus, the obligation on the part of the sellers to convey title never acquired obligatory force.

There was no double sale in this case because the contract in favor of Babasanta was a mere contract to sell; hence, Art. 1544 is not applicable. There was neither actual nor constructive delivery as his title is based on a mere receipt. Based on this alone, the right of SLDC must be preferred.