[ G.R. No. L-40195, May 29, 1987 ]
VICTORIA R. VALLARTA, PETITIONER, VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE FRANCISCO LLAMAS, PASAY CITY
COURT, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CORTES, J.:
The petitioner seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeals decision
dated December 13, 1974 affirming the Trial Court's judgment convicting her of
estafa. We denied the petition
initially but granted a motion for reconsideration and gave the petition due
course.
As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
Rosalinda
Cruz, the private offended party, and accused Victoria Vallarta are long
time
friends and business acquaintances. On
November 20, 1968. Cruz entrusted to
Victoria Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry. In December of the same
year, Vallarta decided to buy some items,
exchanged one item with another, and issued a post-dated check in the
amount of
P5,000 dated January 30, 1969. Rosalinda Cruz deposited said check with
the bank. However, upon presentment, the check was
dishonored and Cruz was informed that Vallarta's account had been
closed. Cruz apprised Vallarta of the dishonor and
the latter promised to give another check. Later, Vallarta pleaded for
more time. Still later, she started avoiding Cruz. Hence, this
criminal action was instituted.
Based on the foregoing facts, both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals found Vallarta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa.
WE affirm.
Petitioner is charged under Art. 315 (2)(d) as amended by Rep.
Act No. 4885, of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes any person who shall
defraud another "(b)y postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of
an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check."
By virtue of Rep. Act No. 4885, "(t)he failure of the drawer
of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds" is
deemed prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense
or fraudulent act.
To constitute estafa under this provision the act of postdating
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of
defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with
the act of fraud. The offender must be
able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance
of a check whether postdated or not. That is, the latter would not have parted with his money or other
property were it not for the issuance of the check. Likewise, the check should not be issued in payment of a
pre-existing obligation (People v. Lilius, 59 Phil. 339 [1933]).
In seeking acquittal, petitioner stresses that the transaction
between her and Cruz was a "sale or return," perfected and
consummated on November 20, 1968 when the seven pieces of jewelry were
delivered. The check issued in December
1968 was therefore in payment of a pre-existing obligation. Thus, even if it was dishonored, petitioner
claims that she can only be held civilly liable, but not criminally liable
under Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code. She also argues that at any rate, what prompted Cruz to deliver the
jewelry was the social standing of petitioner Vallarta and not the postdated
check.
She thus assigns as errors the finding of the Court a quo
that the jewelries were entrusted on November 20, 1968, but the sale was
perfected in December 1968, and the finding that there was deceit in the
issuance of the postdated check.
In order to arrive at the proper characterization of the
transaction between Vallarta and Cruz, that is, whether it was a "sale or
return" or some other transaction, it is necessary to determine the
intention of the parties.
The following excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes
are significant:
I. Direct Examination of
Rosalinda Cruz:
Q: Now, what happened with that business transaction of yours with Mrs. Vallarta?
A: After that and after she finally agreed to buy two sets and changed the ruby ring with another ring, she gave me postdated check; I waited for January 30, 1969. I deposited the check in the Security Bank. And after that I knew (learned) that it was closed account (TSN, June 29, 1972, p. 9) (Underscoring supplied).
II. Cross-Examination of
Rosalinda Cruz
Q: Now, you mentioned about certain jewelries in Exh. "A." Could you tell under your oath whether all the jewelries listed here (Exh. "A") were taken by Mrs. Vallarta at one single instance?
A: Yes, Sir. It was on one (1) day when I entrusted them to her so she can select what she wants (Id. at p. 22) (Underscoring supplied).
III. Cross-Examination of
Rosalinda Cruz
COURT: But could you still recall or you cannot recall whether you agreed to reduce the cost to Five Thousand Eight Hundred (P5,800.00) Pesos?
A: Yes, Sir. I agreed to reduce it to Five Thousand Eight Hundred (P5,800.00) Pesos, Sir, when I went to see her in her house to finalize what jewelries she wanted (Id. at p. 26).
Note that Vallarta changed the ruby ring because it was not
acceptable to her, and chose another ring. Likewise, the price to be paid for the jewelry was finally agreed upon only
in December 1968. Thus, there was a
meeting of the minds between the parties as to the object of the contract and
the consideration therefore only in December 1968, the same time that the check
was issued. The delivery made on
November 20, 1968 was only for the purpose of enabling Vallarta to select what
jewelry she wanted.
Properly, then, the transaction entered into by Cruz and Vallarta
was not a "sale or return." Rather, it was a "sale on
approval" (also called "sale on acceptance," "sale on trial,"
or "sale on satisfaction" [CIVIL CODE, art. 1502]). In a "sale or return," the
ownership passes to the buyer on delivery (CIVIL CODE, art. 1502). (The subsequent return of the goods reverts
ownership in the seller [CIVIL CODE, art. 1502]). Delivery, or tradition, as a mode of acquiring ownership must be in
consequence of a contract (CIVIL CODE, art. 712), e.g. sale.
If there was no meeting of the minds on November 20, 1968, then,
as of that date, there was yet no contract of sale which could be the basis of
delivery or tradition. Thus, the
delivery made on November 20, 1968 was not a delivery for purposes of
transferring ownership – the prestation incumbent on the vendor. If ownership over the jewelry was not
transmitted on that date, then it could have been transmitted only in December
1968, the date when the check was issued. In which case, it was a "sale on approval" since ownership
passed to the buyer, Vallarta, only when she signified her approval or
acceptance to the seller, Cruz, and the price was agreed upon.
Thus, when the check which later bounced was issued, it was not
in payment of a pre-existing obligation. Instead the issuance of the check was simultaneous with the transfer of
ownership over the jewelry. But was the
check issued simultaneously with the fraud?
Republic Act No. 4885, amending Art. 315(2)(d), Revised Penal
Code, establishes a prima facie evidence of deceit upon proof
that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or
insufficiency of funds.
Admittedly, (1) the check was dishonored as Vallarta's account
had been earlier closed; (2) she was notified by Cruz of the dishonor; and, (3)
Vallarta failed to make it good within three days. Deceit is therefore presumed.
Petitioner lays stress on her being an alumna of a reputable
school, on her having a husband who is a bank manager, and on the big
land-holdings of her father, and argues that it was these qualifications and
not the postdated check which prompted Cruz to deliver the jewelry (Rollo, pp.
78-79; Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 10-11). Hence, there was no deceit. It
is thus suggested that a person of petitioner's social standing cannot be
guilty of deceit, at least in so far as issuing bouncing checks is
concerned. This reasoning does not
merit serious consideration. If
accepted, it could result in a law that falls unequally on persons depending on
their social position.
Did Cruz part with the jewelry solely because she knew Vallarta
to be rich, or did she do so because of the check issued to her? As the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found, petitioner was able to obtain the jewelry because she issued the check. Her failure to deposit the necessary amount
to cover it within three days from notice of dishonor created the prima facie
presumption established by the amendatory law, Rep. Act No. 4885, which she
failed to rebut.
Petitioner, however, contends that Rep. Act No. 4885 is
unconstitutional. She claims that even
as the presumption of deceit established by Rep. Act No. 4885 is stated under
the guise of being prima facie, it is in effect a
conclusive
presumption, because after the prosecution has proved that: (1) the
check has been dishonored; (2)
notice has been given to the drawer; and, (3) three days from notice,
the check
is not funded or the obligation is not paid, the accused is held guilty.
Thus, it is alleged, the constitutional presumption of innocence is
violated.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the presumption of deceit
under Rep. Act No. 4885 is not conclusive. It is rebuttable. For instance,
We ruled in the case of People v. Villapando (56 Phil. 31
[1931]) that good faith is a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a
check, as when the drawer, foreseeing his inability to pay the check at
maturity, made an arrangement with his creditor as to the manner of payment of
the debt.*
Moreover, it is now well settled that "there is no
constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption
of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the
experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption of innocence" (People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856
[1953] at 858-59, citing I COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the
"legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall
be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference
of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because
of lack of connection between the two in common experience" (People v.
Mingoa, supra. See also US v.
Luling, 34 Phil. 725 [1916]).
There can be no doubt that the "postdating or issuing of a
check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank,
or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check," is a false pretense or a fraudulent act. It is so characterized by Art. 315 (2)(d), Revised Penal
Code. Republic Act No. 4885 does
nothing more than limit the period within which the drawer/issuer must pay the
creditor.
Petitioner also argues that Rep. Act No. 4885 violates the
constitutional injunction against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. Ironically, she does not question the
constitutionality of Art. 315(2)(d), Revised Penal Code, which defines the crime
she is being accused of, and provides for its punishment. In fact, she concedes the constitutionality
of the latter statute. She further
concedes that a person may be imprisoned for "criminal fraud" covered
by Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Sabio (No. L-45490, November
20, 1978, 86 SCRA 568), this Court ruled that Rep. Act No. 4885 has not changed
the rule established in Art. 315 (2) (d) prior to the amendment; that Republic
Act No. 4885 merely established the prima facie evidence of
deceit, and eliminated the requirement that the drawer inform the payee that he
had no funds in the bank or the funds deposited by him were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. Thus,
even with the amendment introduced by Rep. Act No. 4885 it is still criminal
fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of the debt.
Petitioner also assigns as error the denial by the trial court of
her motion for reconsideration. Her
motion was directed at the finding of the trial court that no payments were
made. Alleging that a check drawn by
one Sison was given by petitioner to Cruz in payment of the rubber check,
petitioner claims that had her motion for reconsideration been granted, she
would have called to the witness stand the Branch Manager of Security Bank and
Trust Company, Pasay City, where the check was allegedly deposited by Cruz, for
said bank manager to identify the owner-holder of the savings account to which
the amount in Sison's check had been credited (Brief for Petitioner, p. 46).
Granting that the bank manager's testimony would have been as
alleged by petitioner. Our decision
would remain. As correctly observed by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals Decision, pp.
2-3), the payments petitioner allegedly made were not shown to have any
relevance to the obligation in question.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.
* See also People v.
Lilius, supra, where the drawer, upon issuing the check,
stated that he was not sure whether he had sufficient funds in the drawee bank,
and that if he did not have, he would cable to have sufficient funds placed to
his credit.
No comments:
Post a Comment