G.R. No. 52267 January 24, 1996
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 36-51.
2 Special Tenth Decision, composed of J. Porfirio V. Sison, ponente, and JJ. Mariano Serrano and Rodolfo A. Nocon, members.
3 Record on Appeal, pp. 497-510.
4 Judge Pedro C. Navarro presiding.
5 CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 40.
6 Record on Appeal, p. 94.
7 Navarro vs. Court of Appeals., 209 SCRA 612 (June 8, 1992), citing Remalante vs. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138 (February 25, 1988).
8 Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock Construction and Development Corp., G.R. No. 112130, March 31, 1995; J. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, ponente.
9 South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102253, June 2, 1995; J. Jose C. Vitug, ponente.
10 Aquino and Aquino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., vol. 3, p. 246.
11 Comissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Engineering Equipment and Supply Co., 64 SCRA 590 (June 30, 1975); Inchausti & Co. vs. Ellis Cromwell, 20 Phil. (October 16, 1911).
12 Vitug, Compendium on Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 581.
13 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 ed., vol. 5, p. 286, citing 4 Colin & Capitant 477.
14 Art. 1567, Civil Code.
15 210 SCRA 490 (June 26, 1992).
16 Id., citing Moles vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 777 (January 31, 1989).
17 Record on Appeal, pp. 3-8.
18 Record on Appeal, pp. 508-509.
19 Rollo, p. 48-49.
ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PONCIANO L. ALMEDA, respondent.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PONCIANO L. ALMEDA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a contract for the fabrication and installation of
a central air-conditioning system in a building, one of "sale" or "for a
piece of work"? What is the prescriptive period for filing actions for
breach of the terms of such contract?
These are the legal questions brought before this Court in this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. No. 58276-R promulgated on November 28, 1978 (affirming in toto the decision3 dated April 15, 1974 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II4
, in Civil Case No. 14712, which ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent the amount needed to rectify the faults and deficiencies of
the air-conditioning system installed by petitioner in private
respondent's building, plus damages, attorney's fees and costs).
By a resolution of the First Division of this Court
dated November 13, 1995, this case was transferred to the Third. After
deliberating on the various submissions of the parties, including the
petition, record on appeal, private respondent's comment and briefs for
the petitioner and the private respondent, the Court assigned the
writing of this Decision to the undersigned, who took his oath as a
member of the Court on October 10, 1995.
The Facts
Pursuant to the contract dated September 10, 1962
between petitioner and private respondent, the former undertook to
fabricate, furnish and install the air-conditioning system in the
latter's building along Buendia Avenue, Makati in consideration of
P210,000.00. Petitioner was to furnish the materials, labor, tools and
all services required in order to so fabricate and install said system.
The system was completed in 1963 and accepted by private respondent, who
paid in full the contract price.
On September 2, 1965, private respondent sold the
building to the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC).
The latter took possession of the building but on account of NIDC's
noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the deed of sale, private
respondent was able to secure judicial rescission thereof. The
ownership of the building having been decreed back to private
respondent, he re-acquired possession sometime in 1971. It was then that
he learned from some NIDC, employees of the defects of the
air-conditioning system of the building.
Acting on this information, private respondent
commissioned Engineer David R. Sapico to render a technical evaluation
of the system in relation to the contract with petitioner. In his
report, Sapico enumerated the defects of the system and concluded that
it was "not capable of maintaining the desired room temperature of 76ºF -
2ºF (Exhibit C)"5 .
On the basis of this report, private respondent filed
on May 8, 1971 an action for damages against petitioner with the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 14712). The complaint
alleged that the air-conditioning system installed by petitioner did not
comply with the agreed plans and specifications. Hence, private
respondent prayed for the amount of P210,000.00 representing the
rectification cost, P100,000.00 as damages and P15,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
that the prescriptive period of six months had set in pursuant to
Articles 1566 and 1567, in relation to Article 1571 of the Civil Code,
regarding the responsibility of a vendor for any hidden faults or
defects in the thing sold.
Private respondent countered that the contract dated
September 10, 1962 was not a contract for sale but a contract for a
piece of work under Article 1713 of the Civil Code. Thus, in accordance
with Article 1144 (1) of the same Code, the complaint was timely brought
within the ten-year prescriptive period.
In its reply, petitioner argued that Article 1571 of
the Civil Code providing for a six-month prescriptive period is
applicable to a contract for a piece of work by virtue of Article 1714,
which provides that such a contract shall be governed by the pertinent
provisions on warranty of title and against hidden defects and the
payment of price in a contract of sale6 .
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. In its
answer to the complaint, petitioner reiterated its claim of prescription
as an affirmative defense. It alleged that whatever defects might have
been discovered in the air-conditioning system could have been caused by
a variety of factors, including ordinary wear and tear and lack of
proper and regular maintenance. It pointed out that during the one-year
period that private respondent withheld final payment, the system was
subjected to "very rigid inspection and testing and corrections or
modifications effected" by petitioner. It interposed a compulsory
counterclaim suggesting that the complaint was filed "to offset the
adverse effects" of the judgment in Civil Case No. 71494, Court of First
Instance of Manila, involving the same parties, wherein private
respondent was adjudged to pay petitioner the balance of the unpaid
contract price for the air-conditioning system installed in another
building of private respondent, amounting to P138,482.25.
Thereafter, private respondent filed an ex-parte
motion for preliminary attachment on the strength of petitioner's own
statement to the effect that it had sold its business and was no longer
doing business in Manila. The trial court granted the motion and, upon
private respondent's posting of a bond of F'50,000.00, ordered the
issuance of a writ of attachment.
In due course, the trial court rendered a decision
finding that petitioner failed to install certain parts and accessories
called for by the contract, and deviated from the plans of the system,
thus reducing its operational effectiveness to the extent that 35
window-type units had to be installed in the building to achieve a
fairly desirable room temperature. On the question of prescription, the
trial court ruled that the complaint was filed within the ten-year court
prescriptive period although the contract was one for a piece of work,
because it involved the "installation of an air-conditioning system
which the defendant itself manufactured, fabricated, designed and
installed."
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, it instituted the
instant petition.
The Submissions of the Parties
In the instant Petition, petitioner raised three
issues. First, it contended that private respondent's acceptance of the
work and his payment of the contract price extinguished any liability
with respect to the defects in the air-conditioning system. Second, it
claimed that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the defects in
the installation were not apparent at the time of delivery and
acceptance of the work considering that private respondent was not an
expert who could recognize such defects. Third, it insisted that,
assuming arguendo that there were indeed hidden defects, private
respondent's complaint was barred by prescription under Article 1571 of
the Civil Code, which provides for a six-month prescriptive period.
Private respondent, on the other hand, averred that
the issues raised by petitioner, like the question of whether there was
an acceptance of the work by the owner and whether the hidden defects in
the installation could have been discovered by simple inspection,
involve questions of fact which have been passed upon by the appellate
court.
The Court's Ruling
The Supreme Court reviews only errors of law in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine the
findings of fact of the appellate court unless said findings are not
supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts7
of Appeals erred when it held that the defects in the installation
were not apparent at the time of delivery and acceptance of the work
considering that private respondent was not an expert who could
recognize such defects. Third. it insisted that, assuming arguendo
that there were indeed hidden defects, private respondent's complaint
was barred by prescription under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, which
provides for a six-month prescriptive period.
Private respondent, on the other hand, averred that
the issues raised by petitioner, like the question of whether here was
an acceptance of the work by the owner and whether the hidden defects in
the installation could have been discovered by simple inspection,
involve questions of fact which have been passed upon by the appellate
court.
The Court has consistently held that the factual
findings of the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals, are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Among the exceptional
circumstances where a reassessment of facts found by the lower courts is
allowed are when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; when the inference made is
manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised
on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee. After a careful study of the case at bench, we
find none of the above grounds present to justify the re-evaluation of
the findings of fact made by the courts below.8
We see no valid reason to discard the factual
conclusions of the appellate court. . . . (I)t is not the function of
this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence,
testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, particularly where,
such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the first two issues will not be resolved as they raise questions of fact.
Thus, the only question left to be resolved is that
of prescription. In their submissions, the parties argued lengthily on
the nature of the contract entered into by them, viz., whether it was one of sale or for a piece of work.
Article 1713 of the Civil Code defines a contract for a piece of work thus:
By the contract for a piece of work the contractor
binds himself to execute a piece of work for the employer, in
consideration of a certain price or compensation. The contractor may
either employ only his labor or skill, or also furnish the material.
A contract for a piece of work, labor and materials
may be distinguished from a contract of sale by the inquiry as to
whether the thing transferred is one not in existence and which would
never have existed but for the order, of the person desiring it10
. In such case, the contract is one for a piece of work, not a sale. On
the other hand, if the thing subject of the contract would have existed
and been the subject of a sale to some other person even if the order
had not been given, then the contract is one of sale11 .
Thus, Mr. Justice Vitug12 explains that -
A contract for the delivery at a certain price of an
article which the vendor in the ordinary course of his business
manufactures or procures for the general market, whether the same is on
hand at the time or not is a contract of sale, but if the goods are to
be manufactured specially for the customer and upon his special order,
and not for the general market, it is a contract for a piece of work
(Art. 1467, Civil Code). The mere fact alone that certain articles are
made upon previous orders of customers will not argue against the
imposition of the sales tax if such articles are ordinarily manufactured
by the taxpayer for sale to the public (Celestino Co. vs. Collector, 99
Phil. 841).
To Tolentino, the distinction between the two
contracts depends on the intention of the parties. Thus, if the parties
intended that at some future date an object has to be delivered, without
considering the work or labor of the party bound to deliver, the
contract is one of sale. But if one of the parties accepts the
undertaking on the basis of some plan, taking into account the work he
will employ personally or through another, there is a contract for a
piece of work13 .
Clearly, the contract in question is one for a piece
of work. It is not petitioner's line of business to manufacture
air-conditioning systems to be sold "off-the-shelf." Its business and
particular field of expertise is the fabrication and installation of
such systems as ordered by customers and in accordance with the
particular plans and specifications provided by the customers.
Naturally, the price or compensation for the system manufactured and
installed will depend greatly on the particular plans and specifications
agreed upon with the customers.
The obligations of a contractor for a piece of work are set forth in Articles 1714 and 1715 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1714. If the contractor agrees to produce the
work from material furnished by him, he shall deliver the thing produced
to the employer and transfer dominion over the thing. This contract
shall be governed by the following articles as well as by the pertinent
provisions on warranty of title and against hidden defects and the
payment of price in a contract of sale.
Art. 1715. The contractor shall execute the work in
such a manner that it has the qualities agreed upon and has no defects
which destroy or lessen its value or fitness for its ordinary or
stipulated use. Should the work be not of such quality, the employer may
require that the contractor remove the defect or execute another work.
If the contractor fails or refuses to comply with this obligation, the
employer may have the defect removed or another work executed, at the
contractor's cost.
The provisions on warranty against hidden defects,
referred to in Art. 1714 above-quoted, are found in Articles 1561 and
1566, which read as follows:
Art. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for
warranty against the hidden defects which the thing sold may have,
should they render it unfit for the use for which it is intended, or
should they diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent that,
had the vendee been aware thereof, he would not have acquired it or
would have given a lower price for it; but said vendor shall not be
answerable for patent defects or those which may be visible, or for
those which are not visible if the vendee is an expert who, by reason of
his trade or profession, should have known them.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1566. The vendor is responsible to the vendee
for any hidden faults or defects in the thing sold, even though he was
not aware thereof.
This provision shall not apply if the contrary has
been stipulated, and the vendor was not aware of the hidden faults or
defects in the thing sold.
The remedy against violations of the warranty against
hidden defects is either to withdraw from the contract (redhibitory
action) or to demand a proportionate reduction of the price (accion quanti manoris), with damages in either case14 .
In Villostas vs. Court of Appeals15
, we held that, "while it is true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code
provides for a prescriptive period of six months for a redhibitory
action, a cursory reading of the ten preceding articles to which it
refers will reveal that said rule may be applied only in case of implied
warranties"; and where there is an express warranty in the contract, as
in the case at bench, the prescriptive period is the one specified in
the express warranty, and in the absence of such period, "the general
rule on rescission of contract, which is four years (Article 1389, Civil
Code) shall apply"16 .
Consistent with the above discussion, it would appear
that this suit is barred by prescription because the complaint was
filed more than four years after the execution of the contract and the
completion of the air-conditioning system.
However, a close scrutiny of the complaint filed in
the trial court reveals that the original action is not really for
enforcement of the warranties against hidden defects, but one for breach
of the contract itself. It alleged17
that the petitioner, "in the installation of the air conditioning
system did not comply with the specifications provided" in the written
agreement between the parties, "and an evaluation of the
air-conditioning system as installed by the defendant showed the
following defects and violations of the specifications of the agreement,
to wit:
GROUND FLOOR:
"A. RIGHT WING:
Equipped with Worthington Compressor, Model 2VC4
directly driven by an Hp Elin electric motor 1750 rmp, 3 phase, 60
cycles, 220 volts, complete with starter evaporative condenser,
circulating water pump, air handling unit air ducts.
Defects Noted:
1. Deteriorated evaporative condenser panels, coils are full of scales and heavy corrosion is very evident.
2. Defective gauges of compressors;
3. No belt guard on motor;
4. Main switch has no cover;
5. Desired room temperature not attained;
Aside from the above defects, the following were noted not installed although provided in the specifications.
1. Face by-pass damper of G.I. sheets No. 16. This damper regulates the flow of cooled air depending on room condition.
2. No fresh air intake provision were provided which is very necessary for efficient comfort cooling..
3. No motor to regulate the face and by-pass damper.
4. Liquid level indicator for refrigerant not provided.
5. Suitable heat exchanger is not installed. This is an important component to increase refrigeration efficiency.
6. Modulating thermostat not provided.
7. Water treatment device for evaporative condenser was not provided.
8. Liquid receiver not provided by sight glass.
B. LEFT WING:
Worthington Compressor Model 2VC4 is installed complete with 15 Hp electric motor, 3 phase, 220 volts 60 cycles with starter.
Defects Noted:
Same as right wing. except No. 4, All other defects on right wing are common to the left wing.
SECOND FLOOR: (Common up to EIGHT FLOORS)
Compressors installed are MELCO with 7.5 Hp V-belt
driven by 1800 RPM, -220 volts, 60 cycles, 3 phase, Thrige electric
motor with starters.
As stated in the specifications under, Section No.
IV, the MELCO compressors do not satisfy the conditions stated therein
due to the following:
1. MELCO Compressors are not provided with automatic capacity unloader.
2. Not provided with oil pressure safety control.
3. Particular compressors do not have provision for renewal sleeves.
Out of the total 15 MELCO compressors installed to
serve the 2nd floor up to 8th floors, only six (6) units are in
operation and the rest were already replaced. Of the remaining six (6)
units, several of them have been replaced with bigger crankshafts.
NINTH FLOOR:
Two (2) Worthington 2VC4 driven by 15 Hp, 3 phase, 220 volts, 60 cycles, 1750 rpm, Higgs motors with starters.
Defects Noted are similar to ground floor.
GENERAL REMARKS:
Under Section III, Design conditions of specification
for air conditioning work, and taking into account "A" & "B" same,
the present systems are not capable of maintaining the desired
temperature of 76 = 2ºF (sic).
The present tenant have installed 35 window type air
conditioning units distributed among the different floor levels.
Temperature measurements conducted on March 29. 1971, revealed that 78ºF
room (sic) is only maintained due to the additional window type units.
The trial court, after evaluating the evidence
presented, held that, indeed, petitioner failed to install items and
parts required in the contract and substituted some other items which
were not in accordance with the specifications18 , thus:
From all of the foregoing, the Court is persuaded to
believe the plaintiff that not only had the defendant failed to install
items and parts provided for in the specifications of the
air-conditioning system be installed, like face and by-pass dampers and
modulating thermostat and many others, but also that there are items,
parts and accessories which were used and installed on the
air-conditioning system which were not in full accord with contract
specifications. These omissions to install the equipments, parts and
accessories called for in the specifications of the contract, as well as
the deviations made in putting into the air-conditioning system
equipments, parts and accessories not in full accord with the contract
specification naturally resulted to adversely affect the operational
effectiveness of the air-conditioning system which necessitated the
installation of thirty-five window type of air-conditioning units
distributed among the different floor levels in order to be able to
obtain a fairly desirable room temperature for the tenants and actual
occupants of the building. The Court opines and so holds that the
failure of the defendant to follow the contract specifications and said
omissions and deviations having resulted in the operational
ineffectiveness of the system installed makes the defendant liable to
the plaintiff in the amount necessary to rectify to put the air
conditioning system in its proper operational condition to make it serve
the purpose for which the plaintiff entered into the contract with the
defendant.
The respondent Court affirmed the trial court's decision thereby making the latter's findings also its own.
Having concluded that the original complaint is one
for damages arising from breach of a written contract - and not a suit
to enforce warranties against hidden defects - we here - with declare
that the governing law is Article 1715 (supra). However, inasmuch
as this provision does not contain a specific prescriptive period, the
general law on prescription, which is Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
will apply. Said provision states, inter alia, that actions "upon
a written contract" prescribe in ten (10) years. Since the governing
contract was executed on September 10, 1962 and the complaint was filed
on May 8, 1971, it is clear that the action has not prescribed.
What about petitioner's contention that "acceptance
of the work by the employer relieves the contractor of liability for any
defect in the work"? This was answered by respondent Court19 as follows:
As the breach of contract which gave rise to the instant case consisted in appellant's omission to install the equipments (sic),
parts and accessories not in accordance with the plan and
specifications provided for in the contract and the deviations made in
putting into the air conditioning system parts and accessories not in
accordance with the contract specifications, it is evident that the
defect in the installation was not apparent at the time of the delivery
and acceptance of the work, considering further that plaintiff is not an
expert to recognize the same. From the very nature of things, it is
impossible to determine by the simple inspection of air conditioning
system installed in an 8-floor building whether it has been furnished
and installed as per agreed specifications.
Verily, the mere fact that the private respondent accepted the work does not, ipso facto,
relieve the petitioner from liability for deviations from and
violations of the written contract, as the law gives him ten (10) years
within which to file an action based on breach thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
2 Special Tenth Decision, composed of J. Porfirio V. Sison, ponente, and JJ. Mariano Serrano and Rodolfo A. Nocon, members.
3 Record on Appeal, pp. 497-510.
4 Judge Pedro C. Navarro presiding.
5 CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 40.
6 Record on Appeal, p. 94.
7 Navarro vs. Court of Appeals., 209 SCRA 612 (June 8, 1992), citing Remalante vs. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138 (February 25, 1988).
8 Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock Construction and Development Corp., G.R. No. 112130, March 31, 1995; J. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, ponente.
9 South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102253, June 2, 1995; J. Jose C. Vitug, ponente.
10 Aquino and Aquino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., vol. 3, p. 246.
11 Comissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Engineering Equipment and Supply Co., 64 SCRA 590 (June 30, 1975); Inchausti & Co. vs. Ellis Cromwell, 20 Phil. (October 16, 1911).
12 Vitug, Compendium on Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 581.
13 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 ed., vol. 5, p. 286, citing 4 Colin & Capitant 477.
14 Art. 1567, Civil Code.
15 210 SCRA 490 (June 26, 1992).
16 Id., citing Moles vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 777 (January 31, 1989).
17 Record on Appeal, pp. 3-8.
18 Record on Appeal, pp. 508-509.
19 Rollo, p. 48-49.
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