lalie's digest

JULIANA P. YAP, Petitioner,                                                          G.R. No. 101236

vs.                                                                               January 30, 1992      

MATIN PARAS AND ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR.,

Judge of the 3^rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, Respondent.  

According to Yap, Paras sold IN 1971 to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, (in 1990), Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City.  On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr., who dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the issue in the civil case is prejudicial to the criminal case for estafa.

Issue: Is the Judge correct in motu proprio dismissing the criminal case?

Ruling: The judge is wrong. First, he should not have dismissed the criminal case but only suspended it. Second, it was wrong for him to dismiss the criminal case outright, since it requires a motion first from the proper party. 

The rule provides: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Third, there is actually no prejudicial question here. 

Anent the issue of prejudicial question, the rule provides that:

Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:

Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.  It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 

It was held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused". 

Indeed, the civil case at bar does not involve the same facts upon which the criminal action is based. There was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

CARMELITA FUDOT, Petitioner,                                                             G.R. No. 171008

vs.                                                                               September 13, 2007      

CATTLEYA LAND, INC., VELASCO, JR., JJ. Respondent.  

Facts:

Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as respondent) asked someone to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it intended to buy from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on the titles, respondent purchased the nine lots through a Deed of Conditional Sale on 6 November 1992. Subsequently, on 30 August 1993, respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties. The Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were registered with the Register of Deeds on 06 November 1992 and 04 October 1993, respectively. The Register of Deeds refused to actually annotate the deed of sale on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their attaching creditor which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the nine (9) lots were issued, but the Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because the titles covering the same were still unaccounted for.

Later, respondent learned that the Register of Deeds had already registered the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and issued a new title herein.

The respondent filed its Complaintfor Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.

Issue:

Is the issuance of Deed of Sale valid?

Held:

On 31 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision: (i) quieting the title or ownership of the subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent; (iv) dismissing respondent’s claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncion’s claim for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioner’s counterclaim for lack of the required preponderance of evidence.

LORENZO BERICO and VISITACION SANCHEZ, petitioners,          G.R. No. 96306

vs.                                                                                                August 20, 1993      

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division),

CIRIACO FLORES and FELISA BAREJA, respondents.  

Facts:

A certain Jose de los Santos owned a 98,254 square-meter parcel of land designated as Lot No. 785, PLs-32 located at Balo-Andang, San Ramon, San Pascual (now Claveria), Masbate; the property is specifically described in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-671 issued on 31 May 1956. On 31 October 1961, Jose sold, in a private document, a 2 1/4 hectare portion thereof to the private respondents. On 26 November 1963, however, he executed another deed of sale which he acknowledged before a notary public. Private respondents took possession of the portion sold to them immediately after the 1961 sale and declared the same for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent Ciriaco Flores; private respondents likewise paid the taxes thereon.

On 3 January 1963, Jose de los Santos sold one-half of Lot No. 785 to petitioner Lorenzo Berico. Thereafter, or on 30 March 1963, Jose's minor children sold to the same petitioner the remaining half. Jose de los Santos represented his children in this transaction.

Petitioner Berico was aware of the 1961 sale of a portion of the lot to the private respondents and of the latter's possession thereof.

Despite such knowledge and recognition of the sale in favor of and the possession of the property by the private respondents, petitioner Berico registered on 5 June 1968 the two deeds of sale in his favor and caused the cancellation of OCT No. P-671; the latter also secured the issuance in his name of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1346. He paid the appropriate taxes thereon only from 1973 to 1986. It appears, however, that he declared the property for taxation purposes in his wife's name in 1968.

On the other hand, it was only on 8 November 1978 that the private respondents registered the deed of sale in their favor after discovering the cancellation of OCT No. P-671 and issuance in favor of petitioner Berico of TCT No. T-1346.

On 14 December 1978, private respondents filed against the petitioners a complaint for "Annulment of Title" with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Masbate.

Issue:

In the double sale of an immovable property under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, does prescription bar an action by the first vendees, who are in possession of the said property, against the second vendee for the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over the property procured by the latter who has knowledge of the first sale and who recognizes the first vendees' possession?

Held:

Lorenzo Berico's act in causing the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-671 and securing a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1346, knowing that his transfer certificate included a property not his but belonging to plaintiff Flores makes him a holder in bad faith of a certificate and is not to be accorded the protection of the law.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered annulling Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1346 in the name of Lorenzo Berico, and ordering the Register of Deeds for the Province of Masbate to cancel said transfer certificate of title and in lieu thereof, issue a new transfer certificate of title in the name of Lorenzo Berico et. al.

In a more real sense, and insofar as prescription is concerned, petitioners may only acquire ownership of the questioned property — assuming that they did not register the deed of sale in their favor — through extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, and not by ordinary acquisitive prescription since they cannot claim just title or good faith.

Finally, the complaint for annulment of title filed by the private respondents is substantially one for the quieting of title — to quiet their title against a cloud cast by the claim of the petitioners. It is settled that an action to quiet title does not prescribe. 

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.

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ILUMINADO HANOPOL, plaintiff - appellant,                                       G.R. No. L-19248

vs.                                                                               February 28, 1963     

PERFECTO PILAPIL, defendant – appellee.

Facts:

Hanopol claims ownership over the land by virtue of a series of purchases by means of private documents from the Siapos. Pilapil asserts his right on the strength of a duly notarized deed executed by the owners executed in his favour and registered under Act. No. 3344.

Issue:

WON the registration of the second sale in favor of Pilapil affects Hanopol’s rights as the first vendee.

Held:

Yes. The better right referred to in Act No. 3344 is more than a mere prior deed. It involves facts and circumstances which combined, would make it clear that the first buyer has a better right than the second purchaser. There seems tobe no clear evidence of Hanopol’s possession of the land. Hanopol cannot have abetter right than Pilapil who, according to the Trial Court was not a purchaser inbad faith.

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GAMALIEL C. VILLANUEVA and IRENE C. VILLANUEVA, petitioners,    G.R. No. 107624

vs.                                                                               January 28, 1997      

COURT OF APPEALS,SPOUSES JOSE and LEONILA DELA CRUZ, and

SPOUSES GUIDO and FELICITAS PILE, respondents.

Facts:

Gamaliel Villanueva, petitioner, has been a tenant-occupant of a unit in the 3-door apartment building erected on a parcel of land owned by privatae respondents –spouses Jose Dela Cruz and Leonila dela Cruz, with an area of 403 square meters, more or less, located at Short Horn, Project 8, Quezon City , having succeeded in the occupancy of said unit from the previous tenant Lolita Santos sometime in 1985.

About February of 1986, defendant Jose dela Cruz offered said parcel of land with the 3-door apartment building for sale and petitioners, son and mother, showed interest in the property. As an initial step, defendant Jose dela Cruz gave petitioner Irene Villanueva a letter of authority dated February 12, 1986 for her to inspect the subject property. Because said property was in arrears in the payment of the realty taxes, respondent Jose dela Cruz approached petitioner Irene Villanueva and asked for a certain amount to pay for the taxes so that the property would be cleared of any incumbrance. Irene Villanueva gave P10,000.00 on two occasions — P5,000.00 on July 15, 1986 and another P5,000.00 on October 17, 1986.  It was agreed by them that said P10,000.00 would form part of the sale price of P550,000.00.

Sometime thereafter, respondent Jose dela Cruz went to petitioner Irene Villanueva bringing with him Mr. Ben Sabio, a tenant of one of the units in the 3-door apartment building located on the subject property, and requested her and her son to allow said Ben Sabio to purchase one-half (1/2) of the property where the unit occupied by him pertained to which the petitioners consented, so that they would just purchase the other half portion and would be paying only P265,000.00, they having already — given an amount of P10,000.00 used for paying the realty taxes in arrears.

Accordingly the property was subdivided and two (2) separate titles were secured by respondents Dela Cruz. Mr. Ben Sabio immediately made payments by installments.

Sometime in March, 1987 or more specifically on March 6, 1987, respondents Dela Cruz executed in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Guido Pili (sic) and Felicitas Pili, a Deed of Assignment of the other one-half portion of the parcel of land wherein Gamaliel Villanueva's apartment unit is situated, designated as Lot 3-A of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-337290, Block 24, Pcs-4865, with an area of 201.50 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 332445, purportedly as full payment and satisfaction of an indebtedness obtained from respondents Pili.  Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 356040 was issued in the name of Pili also on March 6, 1987.

Immediately thereafter, the petitioners came to know of such assignment and transfer and issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of respondents Pili so that Gamaliel Villanueva complained to the barangay captain of Bahay Turo, Quezon City, on the ground that there was already an agreement between Dela Cruz and themselves that said portion of the parcel of land owned by Dela Cruz would be sold to him. As there was no settlement arrived at, the petitioners elevated their complaint to this Court through the instant action.

Issue:

Was there a perfected contract of sale?

Held:

Sale is a consensual contract. He who alleges it must show its existence by competent proof. Here, the very essential element of price has not been proven. What took place was only a prolonged negotiation to buy and to sell, and at most, an offer and a counter-offer but no definite agreement was reached by the parties.

Lastly, petitioners' claim that they are ready to pay private respondents ^[28] is immaterial and irrelevant as the latter cannot be forced to accept such payment, there being no perfected contract of sale in the first place.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing petitioner’s instant action for specific performance. However, respondent Jose de la Cruz is hereby ordered to refund or reimburse the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to petitioner Irene Villanueva.

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ELENA JANE DUARTE, petitioner,                                                   G.R. No. 173038

vs.                                                                               September 14, 2011      

MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN, respondent.

Facts:

According to respondent, on February 14, 2002, he offered to sell a laptop computer for the sum of P15,000.00 to petitioner thru the help of a common friend, Josephine Dy. Since petitioner was undecided, respondent left the laptop with petitioner for two days. On February 16, 2002, petitioner told respondent that she was willing to buy the laptop on installment. Respondent agreed; thus, petitioner gave P5,000.00 as initial payment and promised to pay P3,000.00 on February 18, 2002 and P7,000.00 on March 15, 2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner gave her second installment of P3,000.00 to Dy, who signed the handwritten receiptallegedly made by petitioner as proof of payment.  But when Dy returned to get the remaining balance on March 15, 2002, petitioner offered to pay only P2,000.00 claiming that the laptop was only worth P10,000.00.Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the remaining balance, respondent thru counsel sent petitioner a demand letter dated July 29, 2002.

Petitioner, however, denied writing the receipt dated February 18, 2002, and receiving the demand letter dated July 29, 2002.  Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of sale. Petitioner said that Dy offered to sell respondent's laptop but because petitioner was not interested in buying it, Dy asked if petitioner could instead lend respondent the amount of P5,000.00. Petitioner agreed and in turn, Dy left the laptop with petitioner. On February 18, 2002, Dy came to get the laptop but petitioner refused to give it back because the loan was not yet paid. Dy then asked petitioner to lend an additional amount of P3,000.00 to respondent who allegedly was in dire need of money. Petitioner gave the money under agreement that the amounts she lent to respondent would be considered as partial payments for the laptop in case she decides to buy it.  Sometime in the first week of March 2002, petitioner informed respondent that she has finally decided not to buy the laptop. Respondent, however, refused to pay and insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop instead.

Issues:

(1) The timeliness of the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA;

(2) The existence of a contract of sale;

(3) Respondent's entitlement to attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Held:

The Petition for Review was
timely filed with the CA

That litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court; counted from May 27, 2004, the date respondent received the RTC Order dated May 13, 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision dated March 19, 2004 or until June 11, 2004, within which to file his Petition for Review with the CA.  Thus, we find that when he filed the Petition for Review with the CA on June 1, 2004, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.

There was a contract of sale between the parties

As to whether there was a contract of sale between the parties, we hold that there was, and the absence of a written contract of sale does not mean otherwise.  A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree upon the object of the sale, the price, and the terms of payment.Once perfected, the parties are bound by it whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required.

In this case, the contract of sale had been partially executed because the possession of the laptop was already transferred to petitioner and the partial payments had been made by her.  Thus, the absence of a written contract is not fatal to respondent's case. 

The award for attorney's fees and 
litigation expenses was proper

Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the legal grounds which justify or warrant the grant of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, among which is when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest

The interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, however, shall apply from the finality of judgment until the total amount awarded is fully paid.

LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC., petitioner,                               G.R. No. 118509

vs.                                                                               March 29, 1996      

COURT  OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents.

 

FACTS:

Phil.Remnants Co. constituted BPI to manage, administer and sell its real property located in Pasig, Metro Manila.

BPI gave authority to real estate broker Pedro Revilla Jr. to sell the lot for P1000 per square meter.

Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed to buy the land and thereafter was allowed to view the land.

Lim and Alfonso LImketkai went to BPI to confirm the sale and both finally agreed that the land would be sold for P1000 per square meter. Notwithstanding the agreement, Alfonso asked BPI if it was possible to pay in terms provided that in case the term is disapproved, the price shall be paid in cash.

Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit

An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS

ISSUE:

WON there was a perfected contract of sale between Limketkai Co. and BPI.

HELD:

There was already a perfected contract of sale because both parties already agreed to the sale of P1000/sq.m. Even if Lim tried to negotiate for a payment in terms, it is clear that if it be disapproved, the payment will be made in cash.

The perfection of the contract took place when Aromin and Albano, acting for BPI, agreed to sell and Alfonso Lim with Albino Limketkai, acting for petitioner Limketkai, agreed to buy the disputed lot at P1,000.00 per square meter. Aside from this there was the earlier agreement between petitioner and the authorized broker. There was a concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object, and on the cause thereof.

The phases that a contract goes through may be summarized as follows:

a. preparation, conception or generation, which is the period of negotiation and bargaining, ending at the moment of agreement of the parties;

b. perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties come to agree on the terms of the contract; and

c. consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed upon in the contract

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ROMULO A. CORONEL, ET. AL., petitioners,                                              G.R. No. 103577

vs.                                                                               October 07, 1996      

COURT  OF APPEALS,  CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ

and  RAMONA  PATRICIA ALCARAZ ,respondents.

FACTS:

Coronel et al. consummated the sale of his property located in Quezon City to respondent Alcaraz. Since the title of the property was still in the name of the deceased father of the Coronels, they agreed to transfer its title to their name upon payment of the down payment of 50K. and thereafter an absolute deed of sale will be executed.

Alcaraz’s mother paid the down payment in behalf of her daughter and as such, Coronel made the transfer of title to their name. Notwithstanding this fact, Coronel sold the property to petitioner Mabanag and rescinded its prior contract with Alcaraz.

ISSUE:

WON the rescission of the first contract between Coronel and Alcaraz is valid.

HELD:

The case is a contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition in which consummation is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father, to their names. Thus, the contract of sale became obligatory.

With regard to double sale, the rule that the first in time, stronger in right should apply. The contention of the petitioner that she was a buyer in good faith because the notice of lis pendens in the title was annotated after she bought the property is of no merit. In case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.

The ruling should be in favor of Alcaraz because Mabanag registered the property two months after the notice of lis pendens was annotated in the title and hence, she cannot be a buyer in good faith.

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AURORA ALCANTARA-DAUS, petitioner,                               G.R. No. 149750

vs.                                                                               June 16, 2003      

Spouses HERMOSO and SOCORRO DE LEON,  respondents.

Facts:

•Hermoso de Leon inherited from his father a certain piece of land by virtue of a deed of extra-judicial partition.

•To arrange the documents for the properties of his parents, Hermoso engaged the services of Atty Juan

•After the death of Atty Juan, documents surfaced revealing that the properties have been conveyed to Hermoso’sbrothers and sisters and, Juan and his sisters though Hermoso did not intend such.

•A deed of extra-judicial partition w/ quitclaim in favor of Rodolfo de Leon surfaced with Hermoso’s signature in it(which was actually forged)

•Rodolfo sold the land to Aurora Alcantara. Hermoso questions the sale.

•RTC ruled that Hermoso’s claim on the land is barred by laches since 18 years has passed since the land was sold. Italso ruled that the deed of extra-judicial partition, being a notarial document, is presumed authentic. CA reversed.

Issue:

Was the sale of the land to Alcantara valid?

Held: 

No. There was no valid delivery as Rodolfo is not the rightful owner of the land. A contract of sale is perfected by mereconsent, upon meeting of the minds, on the offer and acceptance thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment.At this stage, seller’s ownership of the land is not an element in the perfection of the contract. However, this contractcreates an obligation on the part of the seller to transfer ownership and to deliver the subject matter of the contract.

It is during delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold.

It is throughdelivery or tradition that the buyer acquires the real rights of ownership over the thing sold. At the time of delivery,Rodolfo was not the owner of the land, thus the consummation of the contract and the consequent transfer would,then, depend on whether he subsequently acquired ownership of the land in accordance with Art 1434 of the CivilCode.But the extra-judicial partition was found to be forged hence there was no valid transfer of ownership—Rodolfo neverbecame the owner of the land.Possession in good faith and acquisition by virtue of prescription cannot be sustained if it is in derogation of the rightsof the registered owner.

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