CRISMINA GARMENTS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEAL AND NORMA SIAPNO, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
"During the period from February 1979 to April 1979, the herein petitioner, which was engaged in the export of girls' denim pants, contracted the services of the [respondent], the sole proprietress of the D'Wilmar Garments, for the sewing of 20,762 pieces of assorted girls’ denims supplied by the petitioner under Purchase Orders Nos. 1404, dated February 15, 1979, 0430 dated February 1, 1979, 1453 dated April 30, 1979. The petitioner was obliged to pay the respondent, for her services, in the total amount of P76,410.00. At first, the respondent was told that the sewing of some of the pants was defective. She offered to take delivery of the defective pants. However, she was later told by petitioner's representative that the goods were already good. She was told to just return for her check of P76,410.00. However, the petitioner failed to pay her the aforesaid amount. This prompted her to hire the services of counsel whowrote a letter to the petitioner demanding payment of the aforesaid amount within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. On February 7, 1990, the [petitioner]'s vice-[p]resident-comptroller, wrote a letter to [respondent]'s counsel, averring, inter alia, that the pairs of jeans sewn by her, numbering 6,164 pairs, were defective and that she was liable to the [petitioner] for the amount of P49,925.51 which was the value of the damaged pairs of denim pants and demanded refund of the aforesaid amount. "On January 8, 1981, the [respondent] filed her complaint against the [petitioner] with the [trial court] for the collection of the principal amount of P76,410.00. x xx Issue: Whether or not it is proper to impose interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum for an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties. Ruling: Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Furthermore, since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the Complaint was filed, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said Complaint. But after the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should be reckoned at twelve percent (12%) per year. The rate of interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of the filing of the Complaint in the trial court until the finality of the judgment. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied. No pronouncement as to costs.
OPULENCIA V. SIMUNDAC (1998) Facts: In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private respondents] AladinSimundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia CarpenaOpulencia executed in their favor a “CONTRACT TO SELL” Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorney’s fee and litigation expenses. In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract. Issue: Whether or not the Contract toSell executed by the petitioner and private respondents without the requisite probate court approval is valid.” Held: The Contract to Sell is valid. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the “lawful owner” and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be “difficulties in her living” conditions and consequent “need of cash.”[13] These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no application to the instant case. The Court emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.
DE GUZMAN V. TOYOTA (2006) Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Order, dated September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (the RTC), Branch 105, which dismissed the complaint for damages filed by petitioner Carlos B. De Guzman against respondent Toyota Cubao, Inc. On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab motor vehicle, 1996 model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment of P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty. On April 20, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent with the RTC. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground that under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, the petitioner's cause of action had prescribed as the case was filed more than six months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered. Issue: Has the right of the plaintiff to file an action for damages against the respondent already prescribe? Held: Yes. Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner's complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold.[7] Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his cause of action had become time-barred.
MOLES V. DIOLOSA (1989) Facts: In 1977, petitioner needed a linotype printing machine for his printing business, the LM Press at Bacolod City, and applied for an industrial loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines (hereinafter, DBP) for the purchase thereof. An agent of Smith, Bell and Co. introduced the latter to private respondent, owner of the Diolosa Publishing House in Iloilo City, who had two available machines. Thereafter, petitioner went to Iloilo City to inspect the two machines offered for sale and was informed that the same were secondhand but functional. The petitioner together with Rogelio Yusay, a letterpress machine operator, decided to buy the linotype machine. The transaction was basically verbal in nature but to facilitate the loan application with the DBP, a pro forma invoice, dated April 23, 1977 and reflecting the amount of P50,000.00 as the consideration of the sale, was signed by petitioner with an addendum that payment had to not yet been made but that he promised pay the full amount upon the release of his loan from the aforementioned bank on or before the end of the month. The machine was delivered to petitioner's publishing house. Another employee of the Diolosa Publishing House, Tomas Plondaya, stayed at petitioner's house for almost a month to train the latter's cousin in operating the machine. After that, private respondent issued a certification wherein he warranted that the machine sold was in "A-1 condition", together with other express warranties. On November 29, 1977, petitioner wrote private respondent that the machine was not functioning properly as it needed a new distributor bar. Private respondent made no reply to said letter. After several telephone calls regarding the defects in the machine, private respondent sent two technicians to make thenecessary repairs but they failed to put the machine in running condition. In fact, since then petitioner was never able to use the machine. Issue: Can the plaintiff’s actionfor rescission of contractfiled against the private respondent prosper? Why? Held: Yes, on the basis of the foregoing circumstances, the inescapable conclusion is that private respondent is indeed bound by the express warranty he executed in favor of herein petitioner and while it is true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides for a prescriptive period of six months for a redhibitory action, a cursory reading of the ten preceding articles to which it refers will reveal that said rule may be applied only in case of implied warranties. Consequently, the general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years, shall apply. Considering that the original case for rescission was filed only one year after the delivery of the subject machine, the same is well within the prescriptive period.
TINIO V. MANZANO (1999) Facts: Private respondent Nellie A. Manzano is a co-owner, together with her brothers and sisters Ernesto Manzano, Roland Manzano, Pamela Manzano and Edna Manzano of Lot No. 113, CCs-167, situated in Victory Norte, Santiago, Isabela. On or about April 12, 1988, while private respondent was abroad, her brothers and sisters sold the aforesaid property to petitioner Rolando Tinio, the son of the other petitioners, spouses Amado and Milagros Tinio, for the price of P100,000.00. In a forged "Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, Claim and Interest", private respondent was made to appear as having waived her rights over Lot No. 113 in favor of Rolando Tinio. Subsequently, on April 19, 1991, Rolando Tinio obtained a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over a portion of Lot No. 113, denominated as Lot No. 113-B, with an area of 105 square meters, from the Bureau of Lands. The patent was registered in the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Isabela, which issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-55907 in the name of Rolando Tinio. Upon private respondent's return to the Philippines in 1994, the plaintiff-appellee offered to redeem the shares of her co-owners pursuant to Articles 1620 and 1621 of the New Civil Code. Receiving no reply, private respondent filed an action for legal redemption before the trial court. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff has the right of legal redemption of the properties of her co-owners under Articles 1619 and 1620 of the New Civil Code. Held: As for the question of jurisdiction, we agree with the appellate court that what is involved in this case is not jurisdiction to dispose public lands which is exclusively vested with the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but the right of legal redemption given to a co-owner of a parcel of land. Jurisdiction is determinable on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. The character of the land as being part of the public domain could not be impliedly included nor could it be inferred, as contended by petitioners, on the first issue of "whether plaintiff can exercise her right of legal redemption of the properties of her co-owners under Articles 1619 and 1620 of the New Civil Code." Neither could statements and/or references in the pleadings and subsequently in the judgments of the lower courts that "Rolando Tinio obtained a Miscellaneous Sales Patent" over the subject property be sufficient to consider the issue as having been raised, or that such fact was already within the knowledge of the courts which should have been adjudicated upon. Verily, herein petitioners as defendants in the court a quo stipulated on the co-ownership by the Manzano siblings and the acquisition by sale of the subject property from the said co-owners. Now that petitioner Rolando Tinio had acquired a certificate of title of the subject property in his name, the same has become private property beyond the control or jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.
"During the period from February 1979 to April 1979, the herein petitioner, which was engaged in the export of girls' denim pants, contracted the services of the [respondent], the sole proprietress of the D'Wilmar Garments, for the sewing of 20,762 pieces of assorted girls’ denims supplied by the petitioner under Purchase Orders Nos. 1404, dated February 15, 1979, 0430 dated February 1, 1979, 1453 dated April 30, 1979. The petitioner was obliged to pay the respondent, for her services, in the total amount of P76,410.00. At first, the respondent was told that the sewing of some of the pants was defective. She offered to take delivery of the defective pants. However, she was later told by petitioner's representative that the goods were already good. She was told to just return for her check of P76,410.00. However, the petitioner failed to pay her the aforesaid amount. This prompted her to hire the services of counsel whowrote a letter to the petitioner demanding payment of the aforesaid amount within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. On February 7, 1990, the [petitioner]'s vice-[p]resident-comptroller, wrote a letter to [respondent]'s counsel, averring, inter alia, that the pairs of jeans sewn by her, numbering 6,164 pairs, were defective and that she was liable to the [petitioner] for the amount of P49,925.51 which was the value of the damaged pairs of denim pants and demanded refund of the aforesaid amount. "On January 8, 1981, the [respondent] filed her complaint against the [petitioner] with the [trial court] for the collection of the principal amount of P76,410.00. x xx Issue: Whether or not it is proper to impose interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum for an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties. Ruling: Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Furthermore, since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the Complaint was filed, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said Complaint. But after the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should be reckoned at twelve percent (12%) per year. The rate of interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of the filing of the Complaint in the trial court until the finality of the judgment. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied. No pronouncement as to costs.
DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NAPOLEON N. ARAGONES, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
On September 18, 1988, herein petitioner Del Monte Philippines Inc. (DMPI) entered into an “Agreement” with MEGA-WAFF, represented by “Managing Principal” Edilberto Garcia (Garcia), whereby the latter undertook “the supply and installation of modular pavement” at DMPI’s condiments warehouse at Cagayan de Oro City within 60 calendar days from signing of the agreement.
Aragones later failed to collect from MEGA-WAFF the full payment of the concrete blocks. He thus sent DMPI a] advising it of MEGA-WAFF’s unpaid obligation and requesting it to earmark and withhold the amount of P188,652.65 “from MEGA-WAFF’s billing” to be paid directly to him “lest Garcia collects and fails to pay him.”
Aragones was thus prompted to file on May 25, 1989 a complaint for sum of money (P188,652.65) with damages against Garcia and/or MEGA-WAFF and DMPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte which was raffled to Branch 5 thereof.
Aragones impleaded DMPI on the strength of Articles 1729 and 1467 of the Civil Code, he contending that it was liable to him who put labor upon or furnished materials for a piece of work.
Issue:
Assuming that defendant DMPI is liable to plaintiff, whether or not cross defendant Garcia/MEGA-WAFF shall be liable to DMPI for reimbursement.
Held:
Of course, while defendant DMPI is indeed directly liable to pay plaintiff the cost of the construction material (modular paving blocks) sought to be collected, this defendant has also a right of recourse against cross defendant Garcia/MEGA-WAFF for reimbursement of whatever amount it will be required here to pay plaintiff, otherwise it would result in making defendant Garcia/MEGA-WAFF enrich itself at the expense of defendant DMPI. Additionally since the evidence on record shows that plaintiff was compelled to litigate this matter if only to collect a just and demandable obligation, the refusal of these defendants to pay their obligation upon demand could not be justified in law, thus both defendants should be condemned to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each and attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00 each, including the cost of this suit.
ISAIAS AND MARCELINA R. FABRIGAS
vs.
SAN FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, INC., RESPONDENT.
Facts:
On April 23, 1983, herein petitioner spouses Isaias and Marcelina(Spouses Fabrigas) and respondent San Francisco Del Monte, Inc. ("Del Monte") entered into an agreement, denominated as Contract to Sell No. 2482-V, whereby the latter agreed to sell to Spouses Fabrigas a parcel of residential The agreement stipulated that Spouses Fabrigas shall pay P30,000.00 as down payment and the balance within ten (10) years in monthly successive installments of P1,285.69.
On January 21, 1985, petitioner Marcelina and Del Monte entered into another agreement denominated as Contract to Sell No. 2491-V, covering the same property but under restructured terms of payment. Under the second contract, the parties agreed on a new purchase price of P131,642.58, the amount of P26,328.52 as down payment and the balance to be paid in monthly installments of P2,984.60 each.
No other payments were made by petitioners except the amount of P10,000.00 which petitioners tendered sometime in October 1987 but which Del Monte refused to accept. For failure to pay, Del Monte notified petitioners on March 30, 1989 that Contract to Sell No. 2482-V had been cancelled and demanded that petitioners vacate the property.
On September 28, 1990, Del Monte instituted an action for Recovery of Possession with Damages against Spouses Fabrigas before the RTC, Branch 63 of Makati City. The complaint alleged that Spouses Fabrigas owed Del Monte the principal amount of P206,223.80 plus interest of 24% per annum. In their answer, Spouses Fabrigas claimed, among others, that Del Monte unilaterally cancelled the first contract and forced petitioner Marcelina to execute the second contract, which materially and unjustly altered the terms and conditions of the original contract.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, upholding the validity of Contract to Sell No. 2491-V and ordering Spouses Fabrigas either to complete payments thereunder or to vacate the property.
Issues:
Whether or not Contract to Sell No. 2491-V is valid and binding.
Held:
The Court notes that defendant, Marcelina Fabrigas, although she had to sign contract No. 2491-V, to avoid forfeiture of her down payment, and her other monthly amortizations, was entirely free to refuse to accept the new contract. There was no clear case of intimidation or threat on the part of plaintiff in offering the new contract to her. At most, since she was of sufficient intelligence to discern the agreement she is entering into, her signing of Contract No. 2491-V is taken to be valid and binding. The fact that she has paid monthly amortizations subsequent to the execution of Contract to Sell No. 2491-V, is an indication that she had recognized the validity of such contract. There is nothing to prevent respondent Del Monte from enforcing its contractual stipulations and pursuing the proper court action to hold petitioners liable for their breach thereof.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, PETITIONER, VS. ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
The BANK is a domestic financial corporation that extends loans to subdivision developers/owners.
Petitioner DELTA is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling real estate properties, which is owned by Ricardo De Leon.
De Leon and his spouse obtained a P4 million loan from the BANK for the express purpose of developing Delta Homes I. To secure the loan, the spouses De Leon executed in favor of the BANK a real estate mortgage (REM) on several of their properties. Subsequently, this REM was amended] by increasing the amount of the secured loan from P4 million to P8 million.Both the REM and the amendment were annotated on TCT No. T-637183]
Sometime in 1997, DELTA executed a Contract to Sell under certain conditions with respondent Angeles Catherine Enriquez (Enriquez) over the house and lot in Lot 4 for the purchase price of P614,950.00. Enriquez made a downpayment of P114,950.00.
When DELTA defaulted on its loan obligation, the BANK, instead of foreclosing the REM, agreed to a dation in payment or a dacion en pago. It appears, however, that the dacion en pago was not annotated on the TCT of Lot 4.
Enriquez filed a complaint against DELTA and the BANK alleging that DELTA violated the terms of its License to Sell. Enriquez sought a full refund of the P301,063.42 that she had already paid to DELTA, award of damages, and the imposition of administrative fines on DELTA and the BANK.
Issues:
Whether the Contract to Sell conveys ownership;
Whether the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation, such that DELTA has no more obligations to the BANK;
Whether the BANK is entitled to damages and attorney's fees for being compelled to litigate; and
What is the effect of Enriquez's failure to appeal the OP's Decision regarding her obligation to pay the balance on the purchase price.
Ruling:
Contract to sell does not transfer ownership
A contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer until the happening of an event, such as full payment of the purchase price. What the seller obliges himself to do is to sell the subject property only when the entire amount of the purchase price has already been delivered to him. "In other words, the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer. It does not, by itself, transfer ownership to the buyer.
Dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation
Without any reservation or condition, the Dacion stated that the assigned properties served as full payment of DELTA's "total obligation" to the BANK. The BANK accepted said properties as equivalent of the loaned amount and as full satisfaction of DELTA's debt. The BANK cannot complain if, as it turned out, some of those assigned properties (such as Lot 4) are covered by existing contracts to sell.
There is nothing on record that warrants the award of exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees in favor of the BANK.
The Court will not review Enriquez's initial claims about the supposed violation of the price ceiling in BP 220, since this issue was no longer pursued by the parties, not even by Enriquez, who chose not to file the required pleadingsbefore the Court. The parties were informed in the Court's September 5, 2007 Resolution that issues that are not included in their memoranda shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Since Enriquez did not file a memorandum in either petition, she is deemed to have waived the said issue.
RIZALINO V. LEONORA (2007)
Facts:
Petitioners Rizalino, Ernesto, Leonora, Bibiano, Jr., Librado, and Enriqueta, all surnamed Oesmer, together with Adolfo Oesmer (Adolfo) and Jesus Oesmer (Jesus), are brothers and sisters, and the co-owners of undivided shares of two parcels of agricultural and tenanted land.
Sometime in March 1989, Rogelio Paular, a resident and former Municipal Secretary of Carmona, Cavite, brought along petitioner Ernesto to meet with a certain Sotero Lee, President of respondent Paraiso Development Corporation, at Otani Hotel in Manila
Pursuant to the said meeting, a Contract to Sell was drafted by the Executive Assistant of Sotero Lee, InocenciaAlmo. On 1 April 1989, petitioners Ernesto and Enriqueta signed the aforesaid Contract to Sell. A check in the amount of P100,000.00, payable to Ernesto, was given as option money. Sometime thereafter, Rizalino, Leonora, Bibiano, Jr., and Librado also signed the said Contract to Sell. However, two of the brothers, Adolfo and Jesus, did not sign the document.
In a letter, petitioners informed the former of their intention to rescind the Contract to Sell and to return the amount of P100,000.00 given by respondent as option money.
Respondent did not respond to the aforesaid letter. Herein petitioners, together with Adolfo and Jesus, filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity or for Annulment of Option Agreement or Contract to Sell with Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. The said case was docketed as Civil Case No. BCV-91-49.
Issue:
Is the Contract to Sell entered into by the parties is one with a unilateral promise to sell?
Held:
No, the Contract to Sell entered into by the parties is not a unilateral promise to sell merely because it used the word option money when it referred to the amount of P100,000.00, which also form part of the purchase price.Although the same was denominated as "option money," it is actually in the nature of earnest money or down payment when considered with the other terms of the contract. Doubtless, the agreement is not a mere unilateral promise to sell, but, indeed, it is a Contract to Sell. OPULENCIA V. SIMUNDAC (1998) Facts: In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private respondents] AladinSimundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia CarpenaOpulencia executed in their favor a “CONTRACT TO SELL” Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorney’s fee and litigation expenses. In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract. Issue: Whether or not the Contract toSell executed by the petitioner and private respondents without the requisite probate court approval is valid.” Held: The Contract to Sell is valid. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the “lawful owner” and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be “difficulties in her living” conditions and consequent “need of cash.”[13] These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no application to the instant case. The Court emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.
DE GUZMAN V. TOYOTA (2006) Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Order, dated September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (the RTC), Branch 105, which dismissed the complaint for damages filed by petitioner Carlos B. De Guzman against respondent Toyota Cubao, Inc. On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab motor vehicle, 1996 model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment of P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty. On April 20, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent with the RTC. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground that under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, the petitioner's cause of action had prescribed as the case was filed more than six months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered. Issue: Has the right of the plaintiff to file an action for damages against the respondent already prescribe? Held: Yes. Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner's complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold.[7] Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his cause of action had become time-barred.
MOLES V. DIOLOSA (1989) Facts: In 1977, petitioner needed a linotype printing machine for his printing business, the LM Press at Bacolod City, and applied for an industrial loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines (hereinafter, DBP) for the purchase thereof. An agent of Smith, Bell and Co. introduced the latter to private respondent, owner of the Diolosa Publishing House in Iloilo City, who had two available machines. Thereafter, petitioner went to Iloilo City to inspect the two machines offered for sale and was informed that the same were secondhand but functional. The petitioner together with Rogelio Yusay, a letterpress machine operator, decided to buy the linotype machine. The transaction was basically verbal in nature but to facilitate the loan application with the DBP, a pro forma invoice, dated April 23, 1977 and reflecting the amount of P50,000.00 as the consideration of the sale, was signed by petitioner with an addendum that payment had to not yet been made but that he promised pay the full amount upon the release of his loan from the aforementioned bank on or before the end of the month. The machine was delivered to petitioner's publishing house. Another employee of the Diolosa Publishing House, Tomas Plondaya, stayed at petitioner's house for almost a month to train the latter's cousin in operating the machine. After that, private respondent issued a certification wherein he warranted that the machine sold was in "A-1 condition", together with other express warranties. On November 29, 1977, petitioner wrote private respondent that the machine was not functioning properly as it needed a new distributor bar. Private respondent made no reply to said letter. After several telephone calls regarding the defects in the machine, private respondent sent two technicians to make thenecessary repairs but they failed to put the machine in running condition. In fact, since then petitioner was never able to use the machine. Issue: Can the plaintiff’s actionfor rescission of contractfiled against the private respondent prosper? Why? Held: Yes, on the basis of the foregoing circumstances, the inescapable conclusion is that private respondent is indeed bound by the express warranty he executed in favor of herein petitioner and while it is true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides for a prescriptive period of six months for a redhibitory action, a cursory reading of the ten preceding articles to which it refers will reveal that said rule may be applied only in case of implied warranties. Consequently, the general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years, shall apply. Considering that the original case for rescission was filed only one year after the delivery of the subject machine, the same is well within the prescriptive period.
TINIO V. MANZANO (1999) Facts: Private respondent Nellie A. Manzano is a co-owner, together with her brothers and sisters Ernesto Manzano, Roland Manzano, Pamela Manzano and Edna Manzano of Lot No. 113, CCs-167, situated in Victory Norte, Santiago, Isabela. On or about April 12, 1988, while private respondent was abroad, her brothers and sisters sold the aforesaid property to petitioner Rolando Tinio, the son of the other petitioners, spouses Amado and Milagros Tinio, for the price of P100,000.00. In a forged "Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, Claim and Interest", private respondent was made to appear as having waived her rights over Lot No. 113 in favor of Rolando Tinio. Subsequently, on April 19, 1991, Rolando Tinio obtained a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over a portion of Lot No. 113, denominated as Lot No. 113-B, with an area of 105 square meters, from the Bureau of Lands. The patent was registered in the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Isabela, which issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-55907 in the name of Rolando Tinio. Upon private respondent's return to the Philippines in 1994, the plaintiff-appellee offered to redeem the shares of her co-owners pursuant to Articles 1620 and 1621 of the New Civil Code. Receiving no reply, private respondent filed an action for legal redemption before the trial court. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff has the right of legal redemption of the properties of her co-owners under Articles 1619 and 1620 of the New Civil Code. Held: As for the question of jurisdiction, we agree with the appellate court that what is involved in this case is not jurisdiction to dispose public lands which is exclusively vested with the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but the right of legal redemption given to a co-owner of a parcel of land. Jurisdiction is determinable on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. The character of the land as being part of the public domain could not be impliedly included nor could it be inferred, as contended by petitioners, on the first issue of "whether plaintiff can exercise her right of legal redemption of the properties of her co-owners under Articles 1619 and 1620 of the New Civil Code." Neither could statements and/or references in the pleadings and subsequently in the judgments of the lower courts that "Rolando Tinio obtained a Miscellaneous Sales Patent" over the subject property be sufficient to consider the issue as having been raised, or that such fact was already within the knowledge of the courts which should have been adjudicated upon. Verily, herein petitioners as defendants in the court a quo stipulated on the co-ownership by the Manzano siblings and the acquisition by sale of the subject property from the said co-owners. Now that petitioner Rolando Tinio had acquired a certificate of title of the subject property in his name, the same has become private property beyond the control or jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.
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