SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 73651, November 27, 1987 ]
IGNACIO CARDENTE AND ANASTACIA T. CARDENTE, PETITIONERS,
VS. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SPOUSES RUPERTO RUBIN AND
PRIMITIVA C. RUBIN, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a simple case of
a double sale of an immovable property.
The trial court decided[1] in favor of the first vendee although
the sale was by a private document. The then Intermediate Appellate
Court reversed and set aside the decision[2]
of the lower court. The public respondent appellate court ruled in favor of the second
buyers, who registered their deed of sale.
Hence, the present petition for review by certiorari.
The facts of the case are
as simple as the central issue.
Sometime in 1956,
Francisca Cardente, for and on behalf of her grandson, petitioner Ignacio
Cardente, who was then a minor, and now married to his co-petitioner, purchased
from Isidro Palanay one hectare of land.
The property purchased is a part
of a 9.2656-hectare parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T., for short) No. P-1380 in
Palanay's name. Immediately after the
purchase, the Cardentes took possession of the land and planted various crops
and trees thereon. They have been in
continuous possession ever since, adverse to the whole world. Unfortunately, however, the private document
evidencing the sale of the one-hectare lot to petitioner Ignacio Cardente was
lost and never found despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the same.
Some four years later, on
August 18, 1960,
Isidro Palanay sold the entire property covered by O.C.T. No. P-1380, including
the one-hectare portion already sold to Cardente, this time to the private
respondents, Ruperto Rubin and his wife.
The deed of sale was registered and a new title, Transfer Certificate of
Title (T.C.T., for short) No. 1173, was issued in favor of the Rubin
spouses. Notwithstanding the second
sale, or because of it, Isidro
Palanay, with the written conforme of his wife, Josepha de Palanay, on December
9, 1972, executed a
public document in favor of petitioner Ignacio Cardente confirming the sale
to him (Cardente) in 1956 of the one
hectare portion. The deed of
confirmation likewise states that the subsequent vendee, respondent Ruperto
Rubin, was informed by Palanay of the first sale of the one-hectare portion to
Cardente.
On February
18, 1977, the house
of the petitioners was burned. As a
consequence thereof, they lodged a
complaint for arson with the P.C.-Integrated National Police at Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, against Ruperto Rubin, whom they suspected of having committed the
crime. Apparently, in retaliation, on
March 31, 1977, seventeen long years after their purchase, the private
respondents filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Bukidnon
for quieting of title with damages, against the petitioners, claiming ownership
over the whole property previously covered by O.C.T. No. P-1380, now registered
in their names under T.C.T. No. 1173.
On July 9, 1979, the
trial court dismissed the complaint of the Rubins and ordered them to
"reconvey the one hectare in question to defendant (Cardente) at the
expense of the latter."[3]
The Rubin spouses
appealed to the respondent court, which
rendered the decision under
review. The assailed decision decreed:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and judgment is rendered (1) declaring plaintiffs the absolute owners of subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1173; (2) ordering the defendants to vacate the one-hectare portion in controversy, and to restore plaintiffs in possession thereof; (3) quieting the title of plaintiffs over the one (1) hectare portion of land in controversy; and (4) ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
xxx xxx xxx
Now before us, the
petitioners impute bad faith on the private respondents when the latter purchased the entire property and when they
subsequently registered their title thereto.
By reason of such bad faith, the petitioners' claim that insofar as the
controverted one-hectare parcel of land is concerned the private respondents'
title thereto is null and void.[5]
We agree with the petitioners.
We grant the petition.
Admittedly, this case
involves a double sale. While the
private respondents allegedly bought from Isidro Palanay on August 18, 1960 the
entire property comprising 9.2656 hectares and covered by O.C.T. No. P-1380,
the petitioners, on the other hand, lay claim to one hectare thereof which they
undeniably purchased from the same vendor earlier, in 1956. The conflict, therefore, falls under, and can
be resolved by, Article 1544 of the Civil Code which sets the rules on
double sales.
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
It is undisputed that the
private respondents, the second vendees, registered the sale in their favor
whereas the petitioners, the first buyers, did not. But mere registration of the sale is not enough. Good faith must
concur with the registration. Bad faith
renders the registration nothing but an exercise in futility. The law and jurisprudence are very clear on
this score.[6]
The heart of the problem
is whether or not the private respondents acted in good faith when they
registered the deed of sale dated August 18, 1960 more than six months later, on March 7, 1961. Inextricably, the inquiry must be directed on
the knowledge, or lack of it, of the previous sale of the one-hectare portion
on the part of the second buyers at the time of registration. The trial court found that the second vendees
had such knowledge.
It is true that good faith is always presumed
while bad faith must be proven by the party alleging it.[7] In this case, however, viewed in the light
of the circumstances obtaining, we have no doubt that the private respondents'
presumed good faith has been sufficiently overcome and their bad faith amply
established.
The "Confirmation Of
A Deed Of Absolute Sale Of A Portion Of A Registered Agricultural Land"
executed by the late Ignacio Palanay on December 9, 1972 and which was
exhibited in the trial court below, admitted the sale of the one hectare
portion to the petitioners sometime in 1956.
The same deed likewise explicitly stated that the "fact of the
previous sale, was well known and acknowledged by Mr. Ruperto Rubin (the
private respondent)."[8] These recitals were further buttressed by
Concepcion Salubo, a daughter of Isidro Palanay, who testified that she knew of
the previous sale of the one-hectare portion to petitioner Ignacio Cardente and
that private respondent Ruperto Rubin was properly informed of the said sale.[9] On this regard, no ill-motive had been
attributed to the vendor Isidro Palanay and to his daughter Concepcion Salubo for testifying the way they did --
against the private respondents. They
were disinterested persons who stood to gain nothing except, perhaps, the satisfaction of setting the record
straight, or, in the words of the seller, "for the purpose of giving
efficacy to the Deed of Sale I made to Ignacio Cardente which was made in a private document x x x."[10]
Further, the notorious
and continuous possession and full enjoyment by petitioners of the disputed
one-hectare property long (four years) before the private respondents purchased
the same from Palanay bolsters the petitioners' position. That possession would have been enough to arouse the suspicion of the private respondents as
to the ownership of the entire area which they were about to purchase. Their failure to inquire and to investigate
the basis of the petitioners' actual occupation of the land forming a substantial
part of what they were buying militates against their posited lack of knowledge
of the first sale. "A purchaser
cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted
in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor."[11] We have warned time and again that a buyer
of real property which is in the possession of persons other than the seller
must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a
buyer in good faith.[12]
The private respondents'
avowals that they had never known of the prior sale until the issues were joined
at the trial court, for, before that, they merely tolerated the continued
presence of the original occupants, Francisca and Eugenia Cardente, and Ignacio,
in the premises, out of simple pity for the two old women,[13] is too pat to be believed. For if these were so, the reason why the
private respondents' continued to tolerate the occupation by the petitioners of
the contested property even after the demise of the two old women escapes
us. Rubin's allegation that this was
because they were still in good terms with the petitioners[14] is too lame an excuse to deserve even a
scant consideration. The private
respondents' total lack of action against the actual occupants of a good
portion of the land described in
their torrens title can only be construed as acceptance on their part of the existence of the prior sale and their resignation to the fact that they did not own the
one-hectare portion occupied by the petitioners. Present these facts, the foisted ignorance of
the respondents as to the first sale is an empty pretense. Their seventeen years of inaction and silence
eloquently depict a realization of lack of right.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 19, 1985
and the Resolution dated January 10, 1986 of the former Intermediate Appellate
Court are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Decision dated July 9, 1979 of the Court of First Instance of
Bukidnon in Civil Case No. 860, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Judge Emerito C. Ocaya, Court
of First Instance of Bukidnon, Malaybalay, Civil Case No. 860.
[2]
Justice Jose C. Campos, ponente,
with the concurrence of Justices Crisolito Pascual, Serafin E.
Camilon, and Desiderio P. Jurado of the Second Civil Cases Division, G.R. No. CV-66115,
entitled, Rubin, et al. vs.
Cardente, et al.
[4]
Annex "E" of Petition, 4; Rollo, 31.
[5]
Petitioners’ Brief/Memorandum, 1.
[6]
Art. 1544, 2nd par., Civil Code of the
Philippines; Salvoro vs. Tañega, No. L-32988, December 29, 1978, 87 SCRA
349 (1978); Caram, Jr., vs. Laureta, No. L-28740, February 24, 1981, 103
SCRA 7 (1981).
[7]
Santiago vs. Cruz, 19 Phil. 145
(1911); J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-41233,
November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 413 (1979); Duran vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, No. L-64159, September 10, 1985, 138 SCRA 489 (1985).
[8]
Annex "A" of Petition, Rollo,
10.
[9]
Rollo, 14.
[11]
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, supra.
[14]
Rollo,
24.
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