batocael report

Leung Yee vs Strong Machinery Co.
37 PHIL 644
GR No. L-11658
February 15, 1918

FACTS
The Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) purchased from Strong Machinery Co. rice–cleaning machines which CAF installed in one of its buildings.
As security for the purchase price, CAF executed a chattel mortgage on the machines and the building on which they had been installed.
When CEF failed to pay, the registered mortgage was foreclosed and Strong Machinery Co. purchased the building. This sale was annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry.
Later, Strong Machinery Co. also purchased from Agricola the lot on which the building was constructed. The sale wasn't registered in the Registry of Property BUT Strong Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the lot.
However, the same building had been previously purchased by Leung Yee, a creditor of Agricola, at a sheriff's sale despite his knowledge of the prior sale in favor of Strong Machinery Co.. The sale to Leung Yee was registered in the Registry of Property.

ISSUES                                 
1. Was the property's nature changed by its registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry?
2. Who has a better right to the property?

HELD
1. Where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real property, the placing of the document on record in the Chattel Mortgage Registry is a futile act.

Chattel Mortgage refers to the mortgage of Personal Property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute.

Since the building is REAL PROPERTY, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property.

The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal property does not change its character as real property.

Neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry, nor the annotation in said registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the building.

1. Art. 1473 of the New Civil Code provides the following rules on determining ownership of property which has been sold to different vendees:
• If Personal Property – grant ownership to person who 1st possessed it in good faith
• If Real Property – grant ownership to person who 1st recorded it in the Registry

If no entry – grant to person who 1st possessed in good faith

If no proof of possession – grant to person who presents oldest title

Since Leung Yee purchased the property despite knowledge of the previous purchase of the same by Strong Machinery Co., it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith.

“One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein. The same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.”

Good Faith, or the want of it, is a “state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs.” (Wilder vs. Gilman, 55Vt., 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas Lumber Co. vs. Shadel, 52 La. Ann., 2094-2098; Pinkerton Bros. Co. vs. Bromley, 119Mich., 8, 10, 17.)

Honesty Of Intention is the honest lawful intent constituting good faith. It implies a freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.

As such, proof of such knowledge overcomes the presumption of good faith.

Following the rule on possessory rights provided in Art. 1473, Strong Machinery Co. has a better right to the property since it first purchased the same ahead of Leung Yee, the latter not being a purchaser in good faith.

EASEMENT RIGHT OF WAY

TOMAS  ENCARNACION  vs.  COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

 G.R. No. 77628; March 11, 1991

FACTS: Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta  Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns the dominant estate while respondent owns the servient estate which stands between the dominant estate and the national road.

 When the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a road path measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway. One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked and none was given for the portions constituting the pathway.

It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers. Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the road path and so he approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. The request was turned down by the two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.

Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land. During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate, hence, dismissing petitioner's complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and rejected petitioner's claim for an additional easement.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way.

HELD: The Court finds that petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of way, holding that where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.

Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time.

When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.

 Inasmuch as the additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the area of servient estate, and the petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their loss, perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously. But unless and until that option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favour of petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code.

NAUSIANCE

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC.  Vs.  GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ET AL.

G. R. No. L-3422; June 13, 1952

FACTS: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and anyone could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate.

 At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely8 years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."

 The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, stated as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.

ISSUE: Is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play and considered as an attractive nuisance?

HELD: The Supreme Court held in the negative, basing its decision from the great majority of American decisions where such doctrine originated. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. Further, the Court cited the explanation of the Indiana Appellate Court which holds that: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, he is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance.”

As petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner — that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no further discussion.

DONATION

Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan

FACTS:

 On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favour of her brother, petitioner  Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half (½) portion of the former'shouse and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatinganon January 14, 1995, bestowing upon petitioners Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C.Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows:"

That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.

"When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed an action to annul the said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donation smortis  causa. Petitioners deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. The lower court ruled in favour of the respondents, while the

ISSUE:

Whether the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa or inter vivos.

HELD:

Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of thelove and affection of the donor" for the donee,  and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.

 Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.

In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death,the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of are served power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

 In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan’s death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the Acceptance and Attestation clauses of the Deed of Donation.

 That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.

Petition denied.

Revocation of a Donation Based on Ingratitude

NOCEDA VS. DIRECTO

FACTS:

Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo (the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively of the late Celestino Arbizo) extra-judicially settled a parcel of land. Directo’s share was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the same day, Directo donated 625 sq.m. of her share to her nephew.

However, a few months later, another extra-judicial settlement-partition of the same lot was executed. 3/5 of the lot was awarded to Arbizo (widow) while Directo and Noceda (daughter and grandson) got only 1/5 each.

Sometime on the same year when the partitions happened, the nephew (donee) constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. On the other hand, Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts.
Around 3 years later, the nephew removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the 3 huts, and fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent. The latter demanded Noceda to vacate her land, but Noceda refused.

Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against Noceda before the lower court. A survey was conducted and it was found that the area stated in the settlement was smaller than the actual area of the lot. The TC declared the second extra-judicial settlement-partition and the deed of donation revoked (because of ingratitude). The court ordered the nephew (done) to vacate and reconvey the property to Directo. CA affirmed.

The nephew contends that there was no real partition and thus, there is no basis for the charge of usurpation and ingratitude. He also contends that granting revocation is proper, the 1 year period for such revocation has already lapsed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the deed of donation

RULING: NO

The court held that:
“We find unmeritorious petitioner’s argument that since there was no effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him.

It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to Directo; thus, petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to Directo without the latter’s knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

Donee alleged that he usurped donor’s property in the 1st week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986; thus, more than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondent’s share in Lot 1121.
Article 769 expressly states that:

a. the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the done; and that;

b. it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said action within the same period.
The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by the donee in order to bar the present action, which he failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. He also failed to prove that at the time Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for him to institute an action for revocation of her donation.