CEBU SALVAGE CORPORATION VS. PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE
( A case on Bill of Lading )
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Cebu Salvage Corp. (as carrier) and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries, Inc. [MCCII] (as charterer) entered into a voyage charter where petitioner was to load 800-1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board M/T Espiritu Santo for transport and discharge from NegrosOccidental to Misamis Oriental, to consignee Ferrochrome Phils., Inc.-However, the shipment never reached its destination because the vesselsank resulting in the total loss of the cargo.-MCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment with its insurer,respondent Philippine Home Assurance Corp.-Respondent paid the claim and was subrogated to the rights of MCCII,after which it filed a case against petitioner for reimbursement of theamount it paid MCCII.-TC and CA: ordered petitioner to pay respondent.
ISSUE:
Can a carrier may be held liable for the loss of cargo resulting from the sinking of a ship it doesn’t own?
RULING:
YES. Petitioner argues the agreement was just a contract of hire where MCCII hired the vessel from its owner, ALS Timber. Since it wasn’t the owner of the vessel, it didn’t have control and supervision over it and its crew. Thus,it shouldn’t be held liable.
1.Petitioner and MCCII entered into a “voyage charter,” a.k.a contract of affreightment where the ship was leased for a single voyage for theconveyance of the goods, in consideration of the payment of freight.Under a voyage charter, the shipowner retains possession, command andnavigation of the ship, the charterer/freighter just has the use of the spacein the vessel in return for his payment of freight. An owner who retainspossession of the ship remains liable as carrier and must answer forloss or non-delivery of the goods received for transportation.
2. The agreement parties signed was a contract of carriage under which the petitioner was a common carrier . From the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according to the circumstances of each case . In case of loss of the goods, the common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove the causes under Art. 1734 CC or that they observed extraordinary diligence.
3. In this case, Petitioner was the one which contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control over what vessel it would use. The fact that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage didn’t negate its character and duties as common carrier. The bill of lading issued by ALS was just a receipt to evidence the fact that the goods have been received for transportation. It is true that a billof lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the parties but it cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter. The voyage charter stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterer’s account. This just means that the charterer would have the goods insured. It couldn’t exculpate the carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage.
MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS for reimbursement for its loss.
To permit a common carrier toescape its responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport would derogate from the carrier’s duty of extraordinary diligence.
VILLANUEVA V. CHIONG
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325,3 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners forP8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy4 the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986,5 petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents?
(2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid?
RULING:
1. That the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against all the evidence for respondents.
2. The sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not, however, void. We held that without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into.28Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return to respondents the land with its fruits29 and respondent Florentino should return to petitioners the sum ofP8,000, which he received as the price of the land, together with interest thereon.On the matter of fruits and interests, we take into consideration that petitioners have been using the land and have derived benefit from it just as respondent Florentino has used the price of the land in the sum of P8,000. Hence, if, as ordered by the lower court, Florentino is to pay a reasonable amount or legal interest for the use of the money then petitioners should also be required to pay a reasonable amount for the use of the land.30 Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, it would be equitable to consider the two amounts as offsetting each other.
ARCABA VS. TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.
RULING:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
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