CARLOS B. DE GUZMAN vs. TOYOTA CUBAO,
INC.
G.R. No. 141480
November 29, 2006
Facts: On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from
respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab motor vehicle,
1996 model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a
down payment of P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600
which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle was
delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998,
petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it
developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy
rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine
with a new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent countered that the
alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty.
On April 20, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for
damages against respondent with the RTC. Respondent moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, the
petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed as the case was filed more than six
months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered.
Issue: Whether or not there was implied warranty?
Held: Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once
an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and
maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of
an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case,
the allegations in petitioner’s complaint for damages were clearly anchored on
the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e.,
that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not
defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent
responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with
defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have
exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing
sold. Since petitioner filed the complaint
on April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted
from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor
vehicle), his cause of action had become time-barred.
Petitioner contends that the subject
motor vehicle comes within the context of Republic Act No.
7394. Thus, petitioner relies on Article 68 (f) (2) in relation to
Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394. Article 4 (q) of the
said law defines “consumer products and services” as goods, services and
credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family,
household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not limited to,
food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. The following provisions
of Republic Act No. 7394
state:
Art. 67. Applicable Law on
Warranties. — The provisions of the Civil Code on conditions and
warranties shall govern all contracts of sale with conditions and
warranties.
Art. 68. Additional
Provisions on Warranties. — In addition to the Civil Code
provisions on sale with warranties, the following provisions shall govern
the sale of consumer products with warranty:
e) Duration of
warranty. The seller and the consumer may stipulate the period
within which the express warranty shall be enforceable. If the
implied warranty on merchantability accompanies an express warranty, both will
be of equal duration.
Any other implied warranty shall
endure not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one (1) year following the
sale of new consumer products.
f) Breach
of warranties — xxx
x x x
2) In case of breach of
implied warranty, the consumer may retain in the goods and recover
damages, or reject the goods, cancel the contract and
recover from the seller so much of the purchase price as has been paid,
including damages. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently,
even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No.
7394, the same should still be dismissed since the prescriptive period for
implied warranty thereunder, which is one year, had likewise lapsed.
G.R. No. L-45519 April
26, 1939
RUFINA SALAO and LUCIO LUCAS
vs.
TEOFILO C. SANTOS, municipal president of Malabon, Rizal, and ELIGIO GOZON.
Facts: The present action was instituted by plaintiffs Rufina
Salao and Lucio Lucas, now appellants, to restrain the defendant, Teofilo C.
Santos, as municipal president of Malabon, Rizal, from enforcing compliance
with his letter of October 22, 1935, wherein said plaintiffs were directed to
observe he requirements of ordinance No. 23, series of 1929, of said
municipality, on the matter of the operation of their smoked fish factory (umbuyan).
The evidence discloses that for many years prior to
the enactment of this ordinance, plaintiffs had already established a smoked
fish factory in the barrio of Baritan, Malabon, Rizal, and had continually
operated the same since then. On October 30, 1933, Lucio Lucas, one of the
plaintiffs herein, was criminally prosecuted in the justice of the peace court
of Malabon for non-compliance with the requirements of the ordinance
aforementioned, but was acquitted to the charge. Thereafter, the intervenor
herein, Eligio Gozon. whose house is situated near the smoked fish factory of
the appellants, denounced said factory as a nuisance, by lodging a complaint in
the central office of the Bureau of Health seeking relief against its
continuance.
Issue: W/Not the smoked fish factory is a nuisance per se or per
accidens?
Held: It is not disputed that appellants' smoked fish
factory was established long before the enactment of the ordinance in question.
Municipal ordinances, like all statutes, are to be construed as having only
prospective operation unless the intention to give them retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. There is
nothing in the ordinance showing the intention to give it a retrospective
effect. On the contrary, it expressly refers to "fabrica o negocio que se
ha de levantar" and not to factories already established. That such was
the intention of the ordinance of 1929 is confirmed by ordinance No. 10 of
1935, which expressly provides that the amended ordinance "shall not be
applicable to those already operating at the time of the approval" of the
same.
Moreover, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per
se and nuisance per accidens. The first is recognized as a
nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct
menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated
summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is that which depends
upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question
of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.
(Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of
Iloilo, 24 Phil., 471; Monteverde vs.Generoso, 52 Phil., 123, 127.)
Appellants' smoked fish factory is not a nuisance per se. It is a
legitimate industry. If it be, in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, then it would be merely a nuisance per accidens. (Iloilo
Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of
Iloilo, supra; Monteverde vs. Generoso, supra.)
Consequently, the order of the municipal president and those of the health
authorities issued with a view to the summary abatement of what they have
concluded, by their own findings, as a nuisance, are null and void there having
been no hearing in court to the effect
G.R. No. 167213 October 31, 2006
DARREL CORDERO, EGMEDIO BAUTISTA, ROSEMAY BAUTISTA, MARION BAUTISTA,
DANNY BOY CORDERO, LADYLYN CORDERO and BELEN CORDERO, petitioners,
vs.
F.S. MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Facts: On or about October 27, 1994, petitioner Belen
Cordero (Belen), in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of her
co-petitioners Darrel Cordero, Egmedio Bautista, Rosemay Bautista, Marion
Bautista, Danny Boy Cordero and Ladylyn Cordero, entered into a contract to
sell with respondent, F.S. Management and Development Corporation, through
its chairman Roberto P. Tolentino over five (5) parcels of land located in
Nasugbu, Batangas described in and covered by TCT Nos. 62692, 62693, 62694,
62695 and 20987.
Pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the contract to sell, respondent paid earnest money in
the amount ofP500,000 on October 27, 1994. She likewise paid P1,000,000
on June 30, 1995 and another P1,000,000 on July 6, 1995. No further
payments were made thereafter.
Petitioners thus sent respondent a demand
letter dated November 28, 1996 informing her that they were
revoking/canceling the contract to sell and were treating the payments already
made as payment for damages suffered as a result of the breach of contract, and
demanding the payment of the amount of P10 Million Pesos for actual
damages suffered due to loss of income by reason thereof. Respondent ignored
the demand, however.
Hence, on February 21, 1997, petitioner Belen, in her own behalf and as
attorney-in-fact of her co-petitioners, filed before the RTC of Parañaque a
complaint for rescission of contract with damages alleging that respondent
failed to comply with its obligations under the contract to sell, specifically
its obligation to pay the downpayment ofP3.5 Million by April 30, 1995,
and the balance within 18 months thereafter; and that consequently petitioners
are entitled to rescind the contract to sell as well as demand the payment of
damages.
Issues: 1. Whether or not a contract to sell may be
subject to rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil
Code.
2. Whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the award of damages.
Held: In the present case, the nature as well as the
characteristics of a contract to sell is determinative of the propriety of the
remedy of rescission and the award of damages. As will be discussed shortly,
the trial court committed manifest error in applying Article 1191 of the Civil
Code to the present case, a fundamental error which "lies at the base and
foundation of the proceeding, affecting the judgment necessarily," or, as
otherwise expressed, "such manifest error as when removed destroys the
foundation of the judgment." Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled on these matters even if they were not raised in the appeal briefs.
Under a contract to sell, the seller retains title to the thing to be
sold until the purchaser fully pays the agreed purchase price. The full payment
is a positive suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which is not a
breach of contract but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying
title to the purchaser. The non-payment of the purchase price renders the
contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect.
Since the obligation of petitioners did not arise because of the
failure of respondent to fully pay the purchase price, Article 1191 of the
Civil Code would have no application.
The subject contract to sell clearly
states that "title will be transferred by the owner (petitioners) to the
buyer (respondent) upon complete payment of the agreed purchase
price." Since respondent failed to fully pay the purchase price,
petitioners’ obligation to convey title to the properties did not arise. While
rescission does not apply in this case, petitioners may nevertheless cancel the
contract to sell, their obligation not having arisen.This brings this Court to
Republic Act No. 6552 (THE REALTY INSTALLMENT BUYER PROTECTION ACT).
The properties subject of the contract
having been intended for commercial, and not for residential,
purposes, petitioners are entitled to retain the payments already made by
respondent. RA 6552 expressly recognizes the vendor’s right to cancel contracts
to sell on installment basis industrial and commercial properties with full
retention of previous payments. But even assuming that the properties were
not intended for commercial or industrial purpose, since respondent paid less
than two years of installments, it is not entitled to any refund.33 It is on this score that a modification of the
challenged issuances of the appellate court is in order.
Respecting petitioners’ claim for damages, failure to make full payment
of the purchase price in a contract to sell is not really a breach, serious or
otherwise, but, as priorly stated, an event that prevents the obligation of the
vendor to convey title to the property from arising.Consequently, the award of
damages is not warranted in this case.
HEIRS OF PAULINO ATIENZA, G.R.
No. 180665
vs. DOMINGO P. ESPIDOL, August 11,
2010
Facts: Petitioner Heirs of Paulino Atienza, namely, Rufina
L. Atienza, Anicia A. Ignacio, Roberto Atienza, Maura A. Domingo, Ambrocio
Atienza, Maxima Atienza, Luisito Atienza, Celestina A. Gonzales, Regalado
Atienza and Melita A. Dela Cruz (collectively, the Atienzas) own a 21,959
square meters of registered agricultural land at Valle Cruz, Cabanatuan
City. They acquired the land under an emancipation
patent through the government’s land reform program.
On August 12, 2002 the Atienzas and respondent
Domingo P. Espidol entered into a contract called Kasunduan sa
Pagbibili ng Lupa na may Paunang-Bayad (contract to sell land with a
down payment) covering the property. They agreed on a price of P130.00
per square meter or a total of P2,854,670.00, payable in three
installments: P100,000.00 upon the signing of the contract; P1,750,000.00
in December 2002, and the remaining P974,670.00 in June 2003.
Respondent Espidol paid the Atienzas P100,000.00 upon the execution
of the contract and paid P30,000.00 in commission to the
brokers.
When the Atienzas
demanded payment of the second installment of P1,750,000.00 in
December 2002, however, respondent Espidol could not pay it. He
offered to pay the Atienzas P500.000.00 in the meantime,which they
did not accept. Claiming that Espidol breached his obligation, on
February 21, 2003 the Atienzas filed a complaint for the annulment of
their agreement with damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cabanatuan City.
Issues: 1. Whether
or not the Atienzas could validly sell to respondent Espidol the subject land
which they acquired through land reform under Presidential Decree 27(P.D. 27);
2. Whether
or not the Atienzas were entitled to the cancellation of the contract to sell
they entered into with respondent Espidol on the ground of the latter’s failure
to pay the second installment when it fell due; and
3. Whether
or not the Atienzas’ action for cancellation of title was premature absent the
notarial notice of cancellation required by R.A. 6552.
Held: One. The
Atienzas’ title shows on its face that the government granted title to them on
January 9, 1990 by virtue of P.D. 27. This law explicitly prohibits
any form of transfer of the land granted under it except to the government or
by hereditary succession to the successors of the farmer beneficiary.
Upon the enactment of Executive Order
228 in 1987, however, the restriction ceased to be
absolute. Land reform beneficiaries were allowed to transfer
ownership of their lands provided that their amortizations with the Land Bank
of the Philippines (Land Bank) have been paid in full. In
this case, the Atienzas’ title categorically states that they have fully complied
with the requirements for the final grant of title under P.D.
27. This means that they have completed payment of their
amortization with Land Bank. Consequently, they could already
legally transfer their title to another.
Two. Regarding the right to
cancel the contract for non-payment of an installment, there is need to
initially determine if what the parties had was a contract of sale or a
contract to sell. In a contract of sale, the title to the property
passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. In a
contract to sell, on the other hand, the ownership is, by agreement, retained
by the seller and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the
purchase price. In the contract of sale, the buyer’s non-payment of
the price is a negative resolutory condition; in the contract to sell, the
buyer’s full payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition to the
coming into effect of the agreement. In the first case, the seller
has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property unless he takes
action to set aside the contract of sale. In the second case, the
title simply remains in the seller if the buyer does not comply with the
condition precedent of making payment at the time specified in the contract. Here,
it is quite evident that the contract involved was one of a contract to sell
since the Atienzas, as sellers, were to retain title of ownership to the land
until respondent Espidol, the buyer, has paid the agreed
price. Indeed, there seems no question that the parties understood
this to be the case.
Admittedly, Espidol was unable to pay
the second installment of P1,750,000.00 that fell due in December
2002. That payment, said both the RTC and the CA, was a positive
suspensive condition failure of which was not regarded a breach in the sense
that there can be no rescission of an obligation (to turn over title) that did
not yet exist since the suspensive condition had not taken
place. And this is correct so far. Unfortunately, the RTC
and the CA concluded that should Espidol eventually pay the price of the land,
though not on time, the Atienzas were bound to comply with their obligation to
sell the same to him.
But this is error. In
the first place, since Espidol failed to pay the installment on a day certain
fixed in their agreement, the Atienzas can afterwards validly cancel and ignore
the contract to sell because their obligation to sell under it did not
arise. Since the suspensive condition did not arise, the parties
stood as if the conditional obligation had never existed.
The Atienzas had the right to seek
judicial declaration of such non-existent status of that contract to relieve
themselves of any liability should they decide to sell the property to someone
else. Parenthetically, Espidol never offered to settle the full
amount of the price in June 2003, when the last installment fell due, or during
the whole time the case was pending before the RTC.
Three. Notice
of cancellation by notarial act need not be given before the contract between
the Atienzas and respondent Espidol may be validly declare
non-existent. R.A. 6552 which mandated the giving of such notice
does not apply to this case. The cancellation envisioned in that law
pertains to extrajudicial cancellation or one done outside of court,which is not
the mode availed of here. The Atienzas came to court to seek the
declaration of its obligation under the contract to sell
cancelled. Thus, the absence of that notice does not bar the filing
of their action.
Since the contract has ceased to exist, equity would, of
course, demand that, in the absence of stipulation, the amount paid by
respondent Espidol be returned, the purpose for which it was given not having
been attained; and considering that the Atienzas have consistently
expressed their desire to refund the P130,000.00 that Espidol paid.
The Court declares the Kasunduan sa
Pagbibili ng Lupa na may Paunang-Bayad between petitioner Heirs of
Paulino Atienza and respondent Domingo P. Espidol dated August 12, 2002
cancelled and the Heirs’ obligation under it non-existent. The Court
directs petitioner Heirs of Atienza to reimburse the P130,000.00
down payment to respondent Espidol.
Spouses
Eulogio N. Antazo
vs.
Leonides Doblada, Diosdado G.R. no. 178908 February 4, 2010
Facts: Respondents, Leonides
Doblada, Diosdado Celestra, Leopoldo Celestra, Ferdinand Celestra, and Roberto
Doblada, filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners, spouses
Eulogio N. Antazo and Nelia C. Antazo. The complaint alleged that respondents
have been in open and peaceful possession of a parcel of land, identified as
Assessor’s Lot Nos. 112 and 113, located in Barangay Pila-Pila, Binangonan,
Rizal, with an area of, approximately, 551.87 square meters.
Respondents
narrated that, in May 2003, they received a letter from petitioners, through
the Panganiban Law Office, informing them that the latter had bought the
property. It was made to appear in the said letter that respondents forcibly
took possession of the property from petitioners. Respondents replied that they
could not have wrested possession of the property from petitioners, as they
were in possession thereof and that, in fact, on June 11, 2003, petitioners
evicted them therefrom, destroyed respondents’ bamboo fence, and constructed a
concrete perimeter fence thereon.
In
their Answer, petitioners admitted that they sent a letter to respondents
through the Panganiban Law Office, but they denied that respondents had been in
possession of the property since time immemorial. They averred that respondents
failed to show their right to recover possession of the property. On the
contrary, petitioners claimed that they are the ones entitled to possess the
property considering that they purchased it from a certain Carmencita S.
Anciano, registered it for taxation purposes in their names, and paid the real
property tax thereon.
Issue: W/not respondents commit
forcible entry?
Held: Petitioners’
argument is misplaced, considering that this is a forcible entry case. They are
apparently referring to “possession” flowing from ownership of the property, as
opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing more
than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated
in civil law.
Prior physical possession is the
primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a
person with a better right lawfully ejects him. The party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a
strong hand, violence or terror.
We are convinced that respondents
were in prior possession of the property and that petitioners deprived them of
such possession by means of force.
We also note that petitioners did
not deny in their Answer respondents’ allegation that they constructed a
concrete fence on the subject property. Failure to specifically deny the
allegation amounts to a judicial admission. Unlawfully entering the
subject property, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the
prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute
force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No
other proof is necessary.
This case involves
respondents’ cause of action against petitioners for evicting them from the
subject property which was in their possession. It is immaterial how respondents
came into such possession or by what right they did so. Even usurpers of land
owned by another are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected
therefrom.
Granting that
petitioners had earlier possession and respondents were the ones who first
forcibly dispossessed them of the property, this circumstance would not have
given petitioners license to recover possession in the same way. Such course of
action is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule on ejectment. The
underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace
and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and
resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The
party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own
hands. Petitioners would have had a right of action against respondents to
file an ejectment suit, but they evidently let the chance pass and chose the
easier and faster way. Unfortunately for them, this time, their opponents chose
to resort to appropriate judicial measures.
