Saturday, July 28, 2012

G.R. No. 73271 May 29, 1987

SPOUSES TIRSO I. VINTOLA and LORETO DY VINTOLA, defendants-appellants,
vs.
INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA, plaintiff-appellee.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This case was appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which, however, certified the same to this Court, the issue involved being purely legal.

The facts are not disputed.

On August 20, 1975 the spouses Tirso and Loreta Vintola (the VINTOLAS, for short), doing business under the name and style "Dax Kin International," engaged in the manufacture of raw sea shells into finished products, applied for and were granted a domestic letter of credit by the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA), Cebu City. 1 in the amount of P40,000.00. The Letter of Credit authorized the bank to negotiate for their account drafts drawn by their supplier, one Stalin Tan, on Dax Kin International for the purchase of puka and olive seashells. In consideration thereof, the VINTOLAS, jointly and severally, agreed to pay the bank "at maturity, in Philippine currency, the equivalent, of the aforementioned amount or such portion thereof as may be drawn or paid, upon the faith of the said credit together with the usual charges."

On the same day, August 20, 1975, having received from Stalin Tan the puka and olive shells worth P40,000.00, the VINTOLAS executed a Trust Receipt agreement with IBAA, Cebu City. Under that Agreement, the VINTOLAS agreed to hold the goods in trust for IBAA as the "latter's property with liberty to sell the same for its account, " and "in case of sale" to turn over the proceeds as soon as received to (IBAA) the due date indicated in the document was October 19, 1975.

Having defaulted on their obligation, IBAA demanded payment from the VINTOLAS in a letter dated January 1, 1976. The VINTOLAS, who were unable to dispose of the shells, responded by offering to return the goods. IBAA refused to accept the merchandise, and due to the continued refusal of the VINTOLAS to make good their undertaking, IBAA charged them with Estafa for having misappropriated, misapplied and converted for their own personal use and benefit the aforesaid goods. During the trial of the criminal case the VINTOLAS turned over the seashells to the custody of the Trial Court.

On April 12, 1982, the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VII, acquitted the VINTOLAS of the crime charged, after finding that the element of misappropriation or conversion was inexistent. Concluded the Court:

Finally, it should be mentioned that under the trust receipt, in the event of default and/or non-fulfillment on the part of the accused of their undertaking, the bank is entitled to take possession of the goods or to recover its equivalent value together with the usual charges. In either case, the remedy of the Bank is civil and not criminal in nature. ... 2

Shortly thereafter, IBAA commenced the present civil action to recover the value of the goods before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XVI.

Holding that the complaint was barred by the judgment of acquittal in the criminal case, said Court dismissed the complaint. However, on IBAA's motion, the Court granted reconsideration and:

1. Order(ed)defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of Seventy Two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Two and 27/100 (P72,982.27), Philippine Currency, plus interest of 14% per annum and service charge of one (1%) per cent per annum computed from judicial demand and until the obligation is fully paid;

2. Ordered defendants jointly and severally to pay attorney's fees to the plaintiff in the sum of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency, plus costs of the suit. 3

The VINTOLAS rest their present appeal on the principal allegation that their acquittal in the Estafa case bars IBAA's filing of the civil action because IBAA had not reserved in the criminal case its right to enforce separately their civil liability. They maintain that by intervening actively in the prosecution of the criminal case through a private prosecutor, IBAA had chosen to file the civil action impliedly with the criminal action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, reading:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil action. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. ...

and that since the judgment in the criminal case had made a declaration that the facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist, the filing of the civil action arising from the offense is now barred, as provided by Section 3-b of Rule 111 of the same Rules providing:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.

Further, the VINTOLAS take the position that their obligation to IBAA has been extinguished inasmuch as, through no fault of their own, they were unable to dispose of the seashells, and that they have relinguished possession thereof to the IBAA, as owner of the goods, by depositing them with the Court.

The foregoing submission overlooks the nature and mercantile usage of the transaction involved. A letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement is endowed with its own distinctive features and characteristics. Under that set-up, a bank extends a loan covered by the Letter of Credit, with the trust receipt as a security for the loan. In other words, the transaction involves a loan feature represented by the letter of credit, and a security feature which is in the covering trust receipt.

Thus, Section 4 of P.D. No. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction as:

... any transaction by and between a person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in this Decree as the entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document called a "trust receipt" wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods, documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, documents or instrument thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or instruments themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent to any one of the following:

1. In the case of goods or documents, (a) to sell the goods or procure their sale, ...

A trust receipt, therefore, is a security agreement, pursuant to which a bank acquires a "security interest" in the goods. "It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security interest that secures no obligation." 4 As defined in our laws:

(h) "Security Interest"means a property interest in goods, documents or instruments to secure performance of some obligations of the entrustee or of some third persons to the entruster and includes title, whether or not expressed to be absolute, whenever such title is in substance taken or retained for security only. 5

As elucidated in Samo vs. People 6 "a trust receipt is considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral of the merchandise imported or purchased."

Contrary to the allegation of the VINTOLAS, IBAA did not become the real owner of the goods. It was merely the holder of a security title for the advances it had made to the VINTOLAS The goods the VINTOLAS had purchased through IBAA financing remain their own property and they hold it at their own risk. The trust receipt arrangement did not convert the IBAA into an investor; the latter remained a lender and creditor.

... for the bank has previously extended a loan which the L/C represents to the importer, and by that loan, the importer should be the real owner of the goods. If under the trust receipt, the bank is made to appear as the owner, it was but an artificial expedient, more of a legal fiction than fact, for if it were so, it could dispose of the goods in any manner it wants, which it cannot do, just to give consistency with the purpose of the trust receipt of giving a stronger security for the loan obtained by the importer. To consider the bank as the true owner from the inception of the transaction would be to disregard the loan feature thereof. ... 7

Since the IBAA is not the factual owner of the goods, the VINTOLAS cannot justifiably claim that because they have surrendered the goods to IBAA and subsequently deposited them in the custody of the court, they are absolutely relieved of their obligation to pay their loan because of their inability to dispose of the goods. The fact that they were unable to sell the seashells in question does not affect IBAA's right to recover the advances it had made under the Letter of Credit. In so arguing, the VINTOLAS conveniently close their eyes to their application for a Letter of Credit wherein they expressly obligated themselves in these terms:

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, I/we promise and agree to pay you at maturity in Philippine Currency the equivalent of the above amount or such portion thereof as may be drawn or paid upon the faith of said credit together with the usual charges. ... (Exhibit "A")

They further agreed that their marginal deposit of P8,000.00, later increased to P11,000.00

be applied, without further proceedings or formalities to pay or reduce our obligation under this letter of credit or its corresponding Trust Receipt. (Emphasis supplied) 8

The foregoing premises considered, it follows that the acquittal of the VINTOLAS in the Estafa case is no bar to the institution of a civil action for collection. It is inaccurate for the VINTOLAS to claim that the judgment in the estafa case had declared that the facts from which the civil action might arise, did not exist, for, it will be recalled that the decision of acquittal expressly declared that "the remedy of the Bank is civil and not criminal in nature." This amounts to a reservation of the civil action in IBAA's favor, for the Court would not have dwelt on a civil liability that it had intended to extinguish by the same decision. 9 The VINTOLAS are liable ex contractu for breach of the Letter of Credit — Trust Receipt, whether they did or they did not "misappropriate, misapply or convert" the merchandise as charged in the criminal case. 10 Their civil liability does not arise ex delicto, the action for the recovery of which would have been deemed instituted with the criminal-action (unless waived or reserved) and where acquittal based on a judicial declaration that the criminal acts charged do not exist would have extinguished the civil action. 11 Rather, the civil suit instituted by IBAA is based ex contractu and as such is distinct and independent from any criminal proceedings and may proceed regardless of the result of the latter. Under the situational circumstances of the parties, they are governed by Article 31 of the Civil Code, explicitly providing:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 The IBAA has since merged with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, with the latter as the surviving bank.

2 Pp. 11 & 12, Original Record.

3 P.2, Appellants' Brief, p. 16, Rollo.

4 48 Cal. Jur. 633, section 4.

5 Section 3, P.D. No. 115.

6 L-17603-04, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 354, citing 53 Am. Jur. 961.

7 Sia vs. People, L-30896, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 655.

8 Application for Commercial Letter of Credit, Exhibit "A." p. 5, Original Record.

9 PNB vs. Catipon, L-6662, January 31, 1956, 98 Phil. 286.

10 PNB vs. Catipon, supra.

11 Section 3 (b) Rule 111, Rules of Court.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 87958 April 26, 1990

NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURG, PA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITER (PHIL.) INC., petitioners,
vs.
STOLT-NIELSEN PHILIPPINES, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Fajardo Law Offices for petitioners.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Stolt-Nielsen Phil., Inc.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

We uphold the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals that the claim or dispute herein is arbitrable.

On 9 January 1985, United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as SHIPPER) shipped 404.774 metric tons of distilled C6-C18 fatty acid on board MT "Stolt Sceptre," a tanker owned by Stolt-Nielsen Philippines Inc. (hereinafter referred to as CARRIER), from Bauan, Batangas, Philippines, consigned to "Nieuwe Matex" at Rotterdam, Netherlands, covered by Tanker Bill of Lading BL No. BAT-1. The shipment was insured under a marine cargo policy with Petitioner National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg (hereinafter referred to as INSURER), a non-life American insurance corporation, through its settling agent in the Philippines, the American International Underwriters (Philippines), Inc., the other petitioner herein.

It appears that the Bill of Lading issued by the CARRIER contained a general statement of incorporation of the terms of a Charter Party between the SHIPPER and Parcel Tankers, Inc., entered into in Greenwich, Connecticut, U.S.A.

Upon receipt of the cargo by the CONSIGNEE in the Netherlands, it was found to be discolored and totally contaminated. The claim filed by the SHIPPER-ASSURED with the CARRIER having been denied, the INSURER indemnified the SHIPPER pursuant to the stipulation in the marine cargo policy covering said shipment.

On 21 April 1986, as subrogee of the SHIPPER-ASSURED, the INSURER filed suit against the CARRIER, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 (RTC), for recovery of the sum of P1,619,469.21, with interest, representing the amount the INSURER had paid the SHIPPER-ASSURED. The CARRIER moved to dismiss/suspend the proceedings on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the claim the same being an arbitrable one; that as subrogee of the SHIPPER-ASSURED, the INSURER is subject to the provisions of the Bill of Lading, which includes a provision that the shipment is carried under and pursuant to the terms of the Charter Party, dated 21 December 1984, between the SHIPPER-ASSURED and Parcel Tankers, Inc. providing for arbitration.

The INSURER opposed the dismissal/suspension of the proceedings on the ground that it was not legally bound to submit the claim for arbitration inasmuch as the arbitration clause provided in the Charter Party was not incorporated into the Bill of Lading, and that the arbitration clause is void for being unreasonable and unjust. On 28 July 1987, the RTC 1 denied the Motion, but subsequently reconsidered its action on 19 November 1987, and deferred resolution on the Motion to Dismiss/Suspend Proceedings until trial on the merits "since the ground alleged in said motion does not appear to be indubitable."

The CARRIER then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the respondent Appellate Court seeking the annulment of the 19 November 1987 RTC Order. On 12 April 1989, the respondent Court 2 promulgated the Decision now under review, with the following dispositive tenor:

WHEREFORE', the order of respondent Judge dated November 19, 1987 deferring resolution on petitioner Stolt-Nielsen's Motion to Dismiss/Suspend Proceedings is hereby SET ASIDE; private respondent NUFIC (the INSURER) is ordered to refer its claims for arbitration; and respondent Judge is directed to suspend the proceedings in Civil case No. 13498 pending the return of the corresponding arbitral award.

On 21 August 1989, we resolved to give due course and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they have done, the last filed having been Noted on 23 October 1989.

First, herein petitioner-INSURER alleges that the RTC Order deferring resolution of the CARRIER's Motion to Dismiss constitutes an interlocutory order, which can not be the subject of a special civil action on certiorari and prohibition.

Generally, this would be true. However, the case before us falls under the exception. While a Court Order deferring action on a motion to dismiss until the trial is interlocutory and cannot be challenged until final judgment, still, where it clearly appears that the trial Judge or Court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings (University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 439, [1959] citing Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al., vs. Ibanez, et al., 94 Phil. 424 [1954]; Enrique vs. Macadaeg, et al., 84 Phil. 674 [1949]; San Beda College vs. CIR, 97 Phil. 787 [1955]). Even a cursory reading of the subject Bill of Lading, in relation to the Charter Party, reveals the Court's patent lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim.

We proceed to the second but more crucial issue: Are the terms of the Charter Party, particularly the provision on arbitration, binding on the INSURER?

The INSURER postulates that it cannot be bound by the Charter Party because, as insurer, it is subrogee only with respect to the Bill of Lading; that only the Bill of Lading should regulate the relation among the INSURER, the holder of the Bill of Lading, and the CARRIER; and that in order to bind it, the arbitral clause in the Charter Party should have been incorporated into the Bill of Lading.

We rule against that submission.

The pertinent portion of the Bill of Lading in issue provides in part:

This shipment is carried under and pursuant to the terms of the Charter dated December 21st 1984 at Greenwich, Connecticut, U.S.A. between Parcel Tankers. Inc. and United Coconut Chemicals, Ind. as Charterer and all the terms whatsoever of the said Charter except the rate and payment of freight specified therein apply to and govern the rights of the parties concerned in this shipment. Copy of the Charter may be obtained from the Shipper or Charterer. (Emphasis supplied)

While the provision on arbitration in the Charter Party reads:

H. Special Provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, performance or termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York, Owner and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant, broker or individual experienced in the shipping business; the two thus chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who shall be an admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted in conformity with the provisions and procedure of the United States arbitration act, and a judgment of the court shall be entered upon any award made by said arbitrator. Nothing in this clause shall be deemed to waive Owner's right to lien on the cargo for freight, deed of freight, or demurrage.

Clearly, the Bill of Lading incorporates by reference the terms of the Charter Party. It is settled law that the charter may be made part of the contract under which the goods are carried by an appropriate reference in the Bill of Lading (Wharton Poor, Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading (5th ed., p. 71). This should include the provision on arbitration even without a specific stipulation to that effect. The entire contract must be read together and its clauses interpreted in relation to one another and not by parts. Moreover, in cases where a Bill of Lading has been issued by a carrier covering goods shipped aboard a vessel under a charter party, and the charterer is also the holder of the bill of lading, "the bill of lading operates as the receipt for the goods, and as document of title passing the property of the goods, but not as varying the contract between the charterer and the shipowner" (In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F 2d 89, 103 [2d Cir. 1972]; Ministry of Commerce vs. Marine Tankers Corp. 194 F. Supp 161, 163 [S.D.N.Y. 1960]; Greenstone Shipping Co., S.A. vs. Transworld Oil, Ltd., 588 F Supp [D.El. 1984]). The Bill of Lading becomes, therefore, only a receipt and not the contract of carriage in a charter of the entire vessel, for the contract is the Charter Party (Shell Oil Co. vs. M/T Gilda, 790 F 2d 1209, 1212 [5th Cir. 1986]; Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. L-25599, 4 April 1968, 23 SCRA 24), and is the law between the parties who are bound by its terms and condition provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy (Article 1306, Civil Code).

As the respondent Appellate Court found, the INSURER "cannot feign ignorance of the arbitration clause since it was already charged with notice of the existence of the charter party due to an appropriate reference thereof in the bill of lading and, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, it could have easily obtained a copy thereof either from the shipper or the charterer.

We hold, therefore, that the INSURER cannot avoid the binding effect of the arbitration clause. By subrogation, it became privy to the Charter Party as fully as the SHIPPER before the latter was indemnified, because as subrogee it stepped into the shoes of the SHIPPER-ASSURED and is subrogated merely to the latter's rights. It can recover only the amount that is recoverable by the assured. And since the right of action of the SHIPPER-ASSURED is governed by the provisions of the Bill of Lading, which includes by reference the terms of the Charter Party, necessarily, a suit by the INSURER is subject to the same agreements (see St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. vs. Macondray, G.R. No. L-27796, 25 March 1976, 70 SCRA 122).

Stated otherwise, as the subrogee of the SHIPPER, the INSURER is contractually bound by the terms of the Charter party. Any claim of inconvenience or additional expense on its part should not render the arbitration clause unenforceable.

Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settling disputes, has long been recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction (Chapter 2, Title XIV, Book IV, Civil Code). Republic Act No. 876 (The Arbitration Law) also expressly authorizes arbitration of domestic disputes. Foreign arbitration as a system of settling commercial disputes of an international character was likewise recognized when the Philippines adhered to the United Nations "Convention on the Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958," under the 10 May 1965 Resolution No. 71 of the Philippine Senate, giving reciprocal recognition and allowing enforcement of international arbitration agreements between parties of different nationalities within a contracting state. Thus, it pertinently provides:

1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.

2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.

3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

It has not been shown that the arbitral clause in question is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed. Nor has any conflict been pointed out between the Charter Party and the Bill of Lading.

In fine, referral to arbitration in New York pursuant to the arbitration clause, and suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 13498 below, pending the return of the arbitral award, is, indeed called for.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in respondent Appellate Court's 12 April 1989 Decision, the instant Petition for Review on certiorari is DENIED and the said judgment is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur. Paras, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles, Presiding.

2 Penned by Justice Santiago M. Kapunan and concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Abelardo M. Dayrit.

BILL OF LADING

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150403 January 25, 2007

CEBU SALVAGE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

May a carrier be held liable for the loss of cargo resulting from the sinking of a ship it does not own?

This is the issue presented for the Court’s resolution in this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the March 16, 2001 decision2 and September 17, 2001 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 40473 which in turn affirmed the December 27, 1989 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 145, Makati, Metro Manila.5

The pertinent facts follow.

On November 12, 1984, petitioner Cebu Salvage Corporation (as carrier) and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries, Inc. [MCCII] (as charterer) entered into a voyage charter6 wherein petitioner was to load 800 to 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo7 at Ayungon, Negros Occidental for transport to and discharge at Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental to consignee Ferrochrome Phils., Inc.8

Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, 1984, petitioner received and loaded 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo which left Ayungon for Tagoloan the next day.9 The shipment never reached its destination, however, because the M/T Espiritu Santo sank in the afternoon of December 24, 1984 off the beach of Opol, Misamis Oriental, resulting in the total loss of the cargo.10

MCCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment with its insurer, respondent Philippine Home Assurance Corporation.11 Respondent paid the claim in the amount of P211,500 and was subrogated to the rights of MCCII.12 Thereafter, it filed a case in the RTC13 against petitioner for reimbursement of the amount it paid MCCII.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ordered petitioner to pay respondent P211,500 plus legal interest, attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the award and costs of suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner and MCCII entered into a "voyage charter," also known as a contract of affreightment wherein the ship was leased for a single voyage for the conveyance of goods, in consideration of the payment of freight.14 Under a voyage charter, the shipowner retains the possession, command and navigation of the ship, the charterer or freighter merely having use of the space in the vessel in return for his payment of freight.15 An owner who retains possession of the ship remains liable as carrier and must answer for loss or non-delivery of the goods received for transportation.16

Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC finding that the voyage charter it entered into with MCCII was a contract of carriage.17 It insists that the agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII hired the vessel from its owner, ALS Timber Enterprises (ALS).18 Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, petitioner did not have control and supervision over the vessel, its master and crew.19 Thus, it could not be held liable for the loss of the shipment caused by the sinking of a ship it did not own.

We disagree.

Based on the agreement signed by the parties and the testimony of petitioner’s operations manager, it is clear that it was a contract of carriage petitioner signed with MCCII. It actively negotiated and solicited MCCII’s account, offered its services to ship the silica quartz and proposed to utilize the M/T Espiritu Santo in lieu of the M/T Seebees or the M/T Shirley (as previously agreed upon in the voyage charter) since these vessels had broken down.20

There is no dispute that petitioner was a common carrier. At the time of the loss of the cargo, it was engaged in the business of carrying and transporting goods by water, for compensation, and offered its services to the public.21

From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according to the circumstances of each case.22 In the event of loss of the goods, common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove that this was brought about by the causes specified in Article 1734 of the Civil Code.23 In all other cases, common carriers are presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.24

Petitioner was the one which contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control over what vessel it would use. All throughout its dealings with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The fact that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties as a common carrier. The MCCII (respondent’s subrogor) could not be reasonably expected to inquire about the ownership of the vessels which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it is very difficult and often impossible for the general public to enforce its rights of action under a contract of carriage if it should be required to know who the actual owner of the vessel is.25 In fact, in this case, the voyage charter itself denominated petitioner as the "owner/operator" of the vessel.26

Petitioner next contends that if there was a contract of carriage, then it was between MCCII and ALS as evidenced by the bill of lading ALS issued.27

Again, we disagree.

The bill of lading was merely a receipt issued by ALS to evidence the fact that the goods had been received for transportation. It was not signed by MCCII, as in fact it was simply signed by the supercargo of ALS.28 This is consistent with the fact that MCCII did not contract directly with ALS. While it is true that a bill of lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the parties,29 it cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and petitioner executed:

[I]n cases where a Bill of Lading has been issued by a carrier covering goods shipped aboard a vessel under a charter party, and the charterer is also the holder of the bill of lading, "the bill of lading operates as the receipt for the goods, and as document of title passing the property of the goods, but not as varying the contract between the charterer and the shipowner." The Bill of Lading becomes, therefore, only a receipt and not the contract of carriage in a charter of the entire vessel, for the contract is the Charter Party, and is the law between the parties who are bound by its terms and condition provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. 30

Finally, petitioner asserts that MCCII should be held liable for its own loss since the voyage charter stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterer’s account.31 This deserves scant consideration. This simply meant that the charterer would take care of having the goods insured. It could not exculpate the carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage. The law, in fact, prohibits it and condemns it as unjust and contrary to public policy.32

To summarize, a contract of carriage of goods was shown to exist; the cargo was loaded on board the vessel; loss or non-delivery of the cargo was proven; and petitioner failed to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss or that it was due to some casualty or force majeure. The voyage charter here being a contract of affreightment, the carrier was answerable for the loss of the goods received for transportation.33

The idea proposed by petitioner is not only preposterous, it is also dangerous. It says that a carrier that enters into a contract of carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper if it does not own the vessel it chooses to use. MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS for reimbursement for its loss. Certainly, to permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging non-ownership of the vessel it employed) would radically derogate from the carrier's duty of extraordinary diligence. It would also open the door to collusion between the carrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting of liability from the carrier to one without any financial capability to answer for the resulting damages.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Alicia L. Santos (retired) of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 34-46.

3 Id., pp. 32-33.

4 RTC records, pp. 414-419.

5 Now, Makati City.

6 MCCII was represented by its marketing manager Tessie Cu while petitioner was represented by its operations manager Eduardo Y. Romeo; rollo, p. 24.

7 Originally, the vessels named were M/T Seebees IV and M/T Shirley but these were erased (a line put over the words) and replaced with M/T Espiritu Santo; RTC records, p. 5.

8 Id., pp. 5-6; rollo, p. 24 and records, pp. 70-71, 414.

9 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

10 Records, p. 2; rollo, p. 25.

11 Under marine risk note no. FD-14331; id.

12 Id.

13 Docketed as Civil Case No. 11915. Judge Job B. Madayag, Branch 145, RTC of Makati.

14 Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 374 Phil. 325, 333 (1999). Citations omitted.

15 Puromines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91228, 22 March 1993, 220 SCRA 281, 288, citing US v. Shea, 152 US 178, 38 Led 403, 14 S ct 579.

16 Id., p. 289.

17 Rollo, pp. 16-17. A contract of carriage is a contract by which the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger or goods to his/her/its destination. A voyage charter is a type of contract of carriage of goods wherein the owner of the ship leases the whole or part of the ship to another for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id., p. 26.

21 Civil Code, Article 1732.

22 Id., Article 1733.

23 Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

24 Article 1735, Civil Code.

25 See Benedicto v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70876, 19 July 1990, 187 SCRA 547, 553, citations omitted.

26 RTC records, p. 5.

27 Rollo, p. 17.

28 RTC records, p. 70.

29 Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. CA, 349 Phil. 925, 932-933 (1998).

30 National Union Fire Insurance Company Of Pittsburg v. Stolt-Nielsen Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 87958, 26 April 1990, 184 SCRA 682, 688-689, citations omitted.

31 Rollo, pp. 17-18; RTC records, p. 5.

32 Article 1745 of the Civil Code states:

Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:

(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper;

(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods;

xxx xxx xxx

33 Supra note 15, at 288-289.

34 Supra note 25, at 554.

G.R. No. 105395 December 10, 1993

BANK OF AMERICA, NT & SA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INTER-RESIN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FRANCISCO TRAJANO, JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, respondents.

Agcaoili & Associates for petitioner.

Valenzuela Law Center, Victor Fernandez and Ramon Guevarra for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:

A "fiasco," involving an irrevocable letter of credit, has found the distressed parties coming to court as adversaries in seeking a definition of their respective rights or liabilities thereunder.

On 05 March 1981, petitioner Bank of America, NT & SA, Manila, received by registered mail an Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 20272/81 purportedly issued by Bank of Ayudhya, Samyaek Branch, for the account of General Chemicals, Ltd., of Thailand in the amount of US$2,782,000.00 to cover the sale of plastic ropes and "agricultural files," with the petitioner as advising bank and private respondent Inter-Resin Industrial Corporation as beneficiary.

On 11 March 1981, Bank of America wrote Inter-Resin informing the latter of the foregoing and transmitting, along with the bank's communication,
the latter of credit. Upon receipt of the letter-advice with the letter of credit, Inter-Resin sent Atty. Emiliano Tanay to Bank of America to have the letter of credit confirmed. The bank did not. Reynaldo DueƱas, bank employee in charge of letters of credit, however, explained to Atty. Tanay that there was no need for confirmation because the letter of credit would not have been transmitted if it were not genuine.

Between 26 March to 10 April 1981, Inter-Resin sought to make a partial availment under the letter of credit by submitting to Bank of America invoices, covering the shipment of 24,000 bales of polyethylene rope to General Chemicals valued at US$1,320,600.00, the corresponding packing list, export declaration and bill of lading. Finally, after being satisfied that Inter-Resin's documents conformed with the conditions expressed in the letter of credit, Bank of America issued in favor of Inter-Resin a Cashier's Check for P10,219,093.20, "the Peso equivalent of the draft (for) US$1,320,600.00 drawn by Inter-Resin, after deducting the costs for documentary stamps, postage and mail issuance." 1 The check was picked up by Inter-Resin's Executive Vice-President Barcelina Tio. On 10 April 1981, Bank of America wrote Bank of Ayudhya advising the latter of the availment under the letter of credit and sought the corresponding reimbursement therefor.

Meanwhile, Inter-Resin, through Ms. Tio, presented to Bank of America the documents for the second availment under the same letter of credit consisting of a packing list, bill of lading, invoices, export declaration and bills in set, evidencing the second shipment of goods. Immediately upon receipt of a telex from the Bank of Ayudhya declaring the letter of credit fraudulent, 2 Bank of America stopped the processing of Inter-Resin's documents and sent a telex to its branch office in Bangkok, Thailand, requesting assistance in determining the authenticity of the letter of credit. 3 Bank of America kept Inter-Resin informed of the developments. Sensing a fraud, Bank of America sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). With the help of the staff of the Philippine Embassy at Bangkok, as well as the police and customs personnel of Thailand, the NBI agents, who were sent to Thailand, discovered that the vans exported by Inter-Resin did not contain ropes but plastic strips, wrappers, rags and waste materials. Here at home, the NBI also investigated Inter-Resin's President Francisco Trajano and Executive Vice President Barcelina Tio, who, thereafter, were criminally charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The case, however, was eventually dismissed by the Rizal Provincial Fiscal who found no prima facie evidence to warrant prosecution.

Bank of America sued Inter-Resin for the recovery of P10,219,093.20, the peso equivalent of the draft for US$1,320,600.00 on the partial availment of the now disowned letter of credit. On the other hand, Inter-Resin claimed that not only was it entitled to retain P10,219,093.20 on its first shipment but also to the balance US$1,461,400.00 covering the second shipment.

On 28 June 1989, the trial court ruled for Inter-Resin, 4 holding that:
(a) Bank of America made assurances that enticed Inter-Resin to send the merchandise to Thailand; (b) the telex declaring the letter of credit fraudulent was unverified and self-serving, hence, hearsay, but even assuming that the letter of credit was fake, "the fault should be borne by the BA which was careless and negligent"
5 for failing to utilize its modern means of communication to verify with Bank of Ayudhya in Thailand the authenticity of the letter of credit before sending the same to Inter-Resin; (c) the loading of plastic products into the vans were under strict supervision, inspection and verification of government officers who have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions; and (d) Bank of America failed to prove the participation of Inter-Resin or its employees in the alleged fraud as, in fact, the complaint for estafa through falsification of documents was dismissed by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. 6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals 7 sustained the trial court; hence, this present recourse by petitioner Bank of America.

The following issues are raised by Bank of America: (a) whether it has warranted the genuineness and authenticity of the letter of credit and, corollarily, whether it has acted merely as an advising bank or as a confirming bank; (b) whether Inter-Resin has actually shipped the ropes specified by the letter of credit; and (c) following the dishonor of the letter of credit by Bank of Ayudhya, whether Bank of America may recover against Inter-Resin under the draft executed in its partial availment of the letter of credit. 8

In rebuttal, Inter-Resin holds that: (a) Bank of America cannot, on appeal, belatedly raise the issue of being only an advising bank; (b) the findings of the trial court that the ropes have actually been shipped is binding on the Court; and, (c) Bank of America cannot recover from Inter-Resin because the drawer of the letter of credit is the Bank of Ayudhya and not Inter-Resin.

If only to understand how the parties, in the first place, got themselves into the mess, it may be well to start by recalling how, in its modern use, a letter of credit is employed in trade transactions.

A letter of credit is a financial device developed by merchants as a convenient and relatively safe mode of dealing with sales of goods to satisfy the seemingly irreconcilable interests of a seller, who refuses to part with his goods before he is paid, and a buyer, who wants to have control of the goods before paying. 9 To break the impasse, the buyer may be required to contract a bank to issue a letter of credit in favor of the seller so that, by virtue of the latter of credit, the issuing bank can authorize the seller to draw drafts and engage to pay them upon their presentment simultaneously with the tender of documents required by the letter of credit. 10 The buyer and the seller agree on what documents are to be presented for payment, but ordinarily they are documents of title evidencing or attesting to the shipment of the goods to the buyer.

Once the credit is established, the seller ships the goods to the buyer and in the process secures the required shipping documents or documents of title. To get paid, the seller executes a draft and presents it together with the required documents to the issuing bank. The issuing bank redeems the draft and pays cash to the seller if it finds that the documents submitted by the seller conform with what the letter of credit requires. The bank then obtains possession of the documents upon paying the seller. The transaction is completed when the buyer reimburses the issuing bank and acquires the documents entitling him to the goods. Under this arrangement, the seller gets paid only if he delivers the documents of title over the goods, while the buyer acquires said documents and control over the goods only after reimbursing the bank.

What characterizes letters of credit, as distinguished from other accessory contracts, is the engagement of the issuing bank to pay the seller of the draft and the required shipping documents are presented to it. In turn, this arrangement assures the seller of prompt payment, independent of any breach of the main sales contract. By this so-called "independence principle," the bank determines compliance with the letter of credit only by examining the shipping documents presented; it is precluded from determining whether the main contract is actually accomplished or not. 11

There would at least be three (3) parties: (a) the buyer, 12 who procures the letter of credit and obliges himself to reimburse the issuing bank upon receipts of the documents of title; (b) the bank issuing the letter of credit, 13 which undertakes to pay the seller upon receipt of the draft and proper document of titles and to surrender the documents to the buyer upon reimbursement; and, (c) the seller, 14 who in compliance with the contract of sale ships the goods to the buyer and delivers the documents of title and draft to the issuing bank to recover payment.

The number of the parties, not infrequently and almost invariably in international trade practice, may be increased. Thus, the services of an advising (notifying) bank 15 may be utilized to convey to the seller the existence of the credit; or, of a confirming bank 16 which will lend credence to the letter of credit issued by a lesser known issuing bank; or, of a paying bank, 17 which undertakes to encash the drafts drawn by the exporter. Further, instead of going to the place of the issuing bank to claim payment, the buyer may approach another bank, termed the negotiating bank, 18 to have the draft discounted.

Being a product of international commerce, the impact of this commercial instrument transcends national boundaries, and it is thus not uncommon to find a dearth of national law that can adequately provide for its governance. This country is no exception. Our own Code of Commerce basically introduces only its concept under Articles 567-572, inclusive, thereof. It is no wonder then why great reliance has been placed on commercial usage and practice, which, in any case, can be justified by the universal acceptance of the autonomy of contract rules. The rules were later developed into what is now known as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits ("U.C.P.") issued by the International Chamber of Commerce. It is by no means a complete text by itself, for, to be sure, there are other principles, which, although part of lex mercatoria, are not dealt with the U.C.P.

In FEATI Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 19 we have accepted, to the extent of their pertinency, the application in our jurisdiction of this international commercial credit regulatory set of rules. 20 In Bank of Phil. Islands v. De Nery, 21 we have said that the observances of the U.C.P. is justified by Article 2 of the Code of Commerce which expresses that, in the absence of any particular provision in the Code of Commerce, commercial transactions shall be governed by usages and customs generally observed. We have further observed that there being no specific provisions which govern the legal complexities arising from transactions involving letters of credit not only between or among banks themselves but also between banks and the seller or the buyer, as the case may be, the applicability of the U.C.P. is undeniable.

The first issue raised with the petitioner, i.e., that it has in this instance merely been advising bank, is outrightly rejected by Inter-Resin and is thus sought to be discarded for having been raised only on appeal. We cannot agree. The crucial point of dispute in this case is whether under the "letter of credit," Bank of America has incurred any liability to the "beneficiary" thereof, an issue that largely is dependent on the bank's participation in that transaction; as a mere advising or notifying bank, it would not be liable, but as a confirming bank, had this been the case, it could be considered as having incurred that liability. 22

In Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees Association — Natu vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 23 the Court said: Where the issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and as long as they arise from the matters on record, the court has the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy and to pass upon them just as well. In brief, in those cases where questions not particularly raised by the parties surface as necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties, the interests of justice dictate that the court should consider and resolve them. The rule that only issues or theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should only refer to independent, not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action or defense. The evil that is sought to be avoided, i.e., surprise to the adverse party, is in reality not existent on matters that are properly litigated in the lower court and appear on record.

It cannot seriously be disputed, looking at this case, that Bank of America has, in fact, only been an advising, not confirming, bank, and this much is clearly evident, among other things, by the provisions of the letter of credit itself, the petitioner bank's letter of advice, its request for payment of advising fee, and the admission of Inter-Resin that it has paid the same. That Bank of America has asked Inter-Resin to submit documents required by the letter of credit and eventually has paid the proceeds thereof, did not obviously make it a confirming bank. The fact, too, that the draft required by the letter of credit is to be drawn under the account of General Chemicals (buyer) only means the same had to be presented to Bank of Ayudhya (issuing bank) for payment. It may be significant to recall that the letter of credit is an engagement of the issuing bank, not the advising bank, to pay the draft.

No less important is that Bank of America's letter of 11 March 1981 has expressly stated that "[t]he enclosure is solely an advise of credit opened by the abovementioned correspondent and conveys no engagement by us." 24 This written reservation by Bank of America in limiting its obligation only to being an advising bank is in consonance with the provisions of U.C.P.

As an advising or notifying bank, Bank of America did not incur any obligation more than just notifying Inter-Resin of the letter of credit issued in its favor, let alone to confirm the letter of credit. 25 The bare statement of the bank employees, aforementioned, in responding to the inquiry made by Atty. Tanay, Inter-Resin's representative, on the authenticity of the letter of credit certainly did not have the effect of novating the letter of credit and Bank of America's letter of advise, 26 nor can it justify the conclusion that the bank must now assume total liability on the letter of credit. Indeed, Inter-Resin itself cannot claim to have been all that free from fault. As the seller, the issuance of the letter of credit should have obviously been a great concern to it. 27 It would have, in fact, been strange if it did not, prior to the letter of credit, enter into a contract, or negotiated at the every least, with General Chemicals. 28 In the ordinary course of business, the perfection of contract precedes the issuance of a letter of credit.

Bringing the letter of credit to the attention of the seller is the primordial obligation of an advising bank. The view that Bank of America should have first checked the authenticity of the letter of credit with bank of Ayudhya, by using advanced mode of business communications, before dispatching the same to Inter-Resin finds no real support in U.C.P. Article 18 of the U.C.P. states that: "Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the consequences arising out of the delay and/or loss in transit of any messages, letters or documents, or for delay, mutilation or other errors arising in the transmission of any telecommunication . . ." As advising bank, Bank of America is bound only to check the "apparent authenticity" of the letter of credit, which it did. 29 Clarifying its meaning, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 30 explains that the word "APPARENT suggests appearance to unaided senses that is not or may not be borne out by more rigorous examination or greater knowledge."

May Bank of America then recover what it has paid under the letter of credit when the corresponding draft for partial availment thereunder and the required documents were later negotiated with it by Inter-Resin? The answer is yes. This kind of transaction is what is commonly referred to as a discounting arrangement. This time, Bank of America has acted independently as a negotiating bank, thus saving Inter-Resin from the hardship of presenting the documents directly to Bank of Ayudhya to recover payment. (Inter-Resin, of course, could have chosen other banks with which to negotiate the draft and the documents.) As a negotiating bank, Bank of America has a right to recourse against the issuer bank and until reimbursement is obtained, Inter-Resin, as the drawer of the draft, continues to assume a contingent liability thereon. 31

While bank of America has indeed failed to allege material facts in its complaint that might have likewise warranted the application of the Negotiable Instruments Law and possible then allowed it to even go after the indorsers of the draft, this failure, 32/ nonetheless, does not preclude petitioner bank's right (as negotiating bank) of recovery from Inter-Resin itself. Inter-Resin admits having received P10,219,093.20 from bank of America on the letter of credit and in having executed the corresponding draft. The payment to Inter-Resin has given, as aforesaid, Bank of America the right of reimbursement from the issuing bank, Bank of Ayudhya which, in turn, would then seek indemnification from the buyer (the General Chemicals of Thailand). Since Bank of Ayudhya disowned the letter of credit, however, Bank of America may now turn to Inter-Resin for restitution.

Between the seller and the negotiating bank there is the usual relationship existing between a drawer and purchaser of drafts. Unless drafts drawn in pursuance of the credit are indicated to be without recourse therefore, the negotiating bank has the ordinary right of recourse against the seller in the event of dishonor by the issuing bank . . . The fact that the correspondent and the negotiating bank may be one and the same does not affect its rights and obligations in either capacity, although a special agreement is always a possibility . . . 33

The additional ground raised by the petitioner, i.e., that Inter-Resin sent waste instead of its products, is really of no consequence. In the operation of a letter of credit, the involved banks deal only with documents and not on goods described in those documents. 34

The other issues raised in then instant petition, for instance, whether or not Bank of Ayudhya did issue the letter of credit and whether or not the main contract of sale that has given rise to the letter of credit has been breached, are not relevant to this controversy. They are matters, instead, that can only be of concern to the herein parties in an appropriate recourse against those, who, unfortunately, are not impleaded in these proceedings.

In fine, we hold that —

First, given the factual findings of the courts below, we conclude that petitioner Bank of America has acted merely as a notifying bank and did not assume the responsibility of a confirming bank; and

Second, petitioner bank, as a negotiating bank, is entitled to recover on Inter-Resin's partial availment as beneficiary of the letter of credit which has been disowned by the alleged issuer bank.

No judgment of civil liability against the other defendants, Francisco Trajano and other unidentified parties, can be made, in this instance, there being no sufficient evidence to warrant any such finding.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE, and respondent Inter-Resin Industrial Corporation is ordered to refund to petitioner Bank of America NT & SA the amount of P10,219,093.20 with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 Decision in Civil Case No. 41021 of Regional Trial Court, Branch 134, Makati,
p. 15.

2 The Bank of Ayudhya expressed impossibility of availment against the above-mentioned letter of credit because the same had been issued, for the account of Siam Union Metal L.P. (not General Chemicals of Thailand), for a different amount covering "zinc highgrade," and in favor of Electrolytic Zinc Co. of Australasia Ltd. (not Inter-Resin) (Exh. "Q", Record, p. 27).

3 The Bank of America, Bangkok, in an answer to the inquiry of the Bank of America, Manila, stated that General Chemicals of Thailand received the bill of lading but denied having ordered them. However, Bank of America, Bangkok, doubted that it could hold the merchandise in favor of Bank of America, Manila, as it did not have the documents (Exhs. "R" and "R-1," Record, pp. 28-29).

4 The dispositive portion reads : "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. ordering the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit; 2. defendant's counterclaim with the Court found to be tenable and meritorious; 3. plaintiff BA is hereby ordered to pay the defendants the Peso equivalent of US$1,461,400.00 with interests counted from April 21, 1981, until fully paid; 4. plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendants attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00; 5. ordering the dissolution and lifting of the attachment issued by the Court against defendants' properties' and 6. with costs against plaintiff" (Decision in Civil case No. 41021, p. 209).

5 Decision in Civil Case No. 41021, p. 21.

6 Decision in Civil Case No. 41021, pp. 23-24.

7 CA-G.R. CV No. 24236, prom. 28 January 1992; LapeƱa, Jr., ponente, Guingona and Santiago, concurring.

8 Petition, pp. 13-14.

9 See extensive discussions in William S. Shaterian Export-Import Banking: The Instruments and Operations Utilized by American Exporters and Importers and their Banks in Financing Foreign Trade (The Ronal Press Company: New York, 1947, pp. 284-374), James J. White and Robert S. Summers (eds) Uniform Commercial Code (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, 1988) pp. 806-883, and John H. Jackson and William J. Davey Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International Economic Relations, 2nd Ed. (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, pp. 52-63).

10 Article 10 of the U.C.P. defines an irrevocable letter of credit as one that "constitutes a definite undertaking of the issuing bank, provided that the stipulated documents are presented and that the terms and conditions of the credit are complied with: i. if the credit provides for sight payment — to pay, or that payment will be made; ii. if the credit provides for deferred payment — to pay, or that payment will be made, on the date(s) determinable in accordance with the stipulations of the credit; iii. if the credit provides for acceptance — to accept drafts drawn by the beneficiary if he credit stipulates that they are to be drawn on the issuing bank, or to be responsible for their acceptance and payment at maturity if the credit stipulates that they are to be drawn on the applicant for the credit or any other drawee stipulated in the credit; iv. if the credit provides for negotiation — to pay without recourse to drawers and/or bona fide holders, draft(s) drawn by the beneficiary, at sight or at a tenor, on the applicant for the credit or on any other drawee stipulated in the credit other than the issuing bank itself, or to provide for negotiation by another bank and to pay, as above, if such negotiation is not effected.

11 Article 17 of the U.C.P. states: "Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents, or for the general and/or particular conditions stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon; nor do they assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any documents, or for the good faith or acts and/or omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignor, the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or any other person whomsoever."

According to White and Summers, op. cit.: ". . . Bankers . . . (describe) the transaction between the bank and the beneficiary as a "paper transaction." By that they mean the bank issuer's agent should be able to sit with a necktie and a white shirt at a desk in a bank and by looking at papers that are presented to him determine whether the bank is obliged to make payment or not. He is not obligated and, indeed, is foreclosed from donning his overalls and going into the field to determine whether the underlying contract has been performed. This is the principal reason why careful courts and lawyers state that the letter of credit is not a guarantee. In a typical guarantee the guarantor will are to make payments if, and openly if, the customer has failed to fulfill his obligation on the underlying contract. If his obligation has been avoided because of the acts of the beneficiary, typically there would be no obligation to guarantee and thus no duty on the guarantor to pay. Letters of credit are different, and they are explicitly and consciously designed to be different in this respect. In effect, the beneficiary under a letter of credit has bargained for the right to be paid and thus often to be the defendant instead of the plaintiff in the ensuing litigation on the underlying contract, to be sued at home instead of being a plaintiff abroad . . . ."

12 "The buyer of the merchandise, who is also the buyer of the credit instrument, is the party who initiates the operation. His contract is with the bank which is to issue the instrument and is represented by the Commercial Credit of Agreement form which he signs, supported by a mutually made promises contained in the Agreement" (Shaterian, op. cit. pp. 291-292).

13 "The Opening Bank, usually the buyer's bank, is the bank which actually issues the instrument. It is also known as the Issuing Bank. The selection of the opening bank is important. It should be a strong bank, well known and well regarded in international trading circles. This is the reason . . . smaller banks do not attempt to issue their own commercial credit instruments but take advantage of the facilities of . . . much larger, stronger, and better known correspondent banks . . . The purpose of commercial credit may not be readily accomplished unless the opening bank is well known and well regarded" (Shaterian, op. cit., p. 292).

14 "The seller of the merchandise is called the Beneficiary of the credit instrument. The instrument is addressed to him and in his favor. It is a written contract of the bank which cannot compel the beneficiary to ship and avail himself of the benefits of the instrument, the seller may recover from the bank the value of his shipment if made within the terms of the instrument, even though he has not given the bank any direct consideration for the bank's promises contained in the instrument. By a stretch of imagination, as in order to support the instrument as a two-sided contract, supported by mutually given considerations, the courts seem to hold that the commission paid or to be paid by the buyer of the bank is also the consideration flowing from the seller to the bank" (Shaterian, op. cit., p. 292).

15 "Whenever the instrument is not delivered to the buyer and by him mailed to the beneficiary, the opening bank will advise the existence of the credit to the beneficiary through its corresponding bank operating in the same locality as the seller. Such correspondent bank becomes the Notifying Bank. The services of a notifying bank must always be utilized if the credit is to be advised to the beneficiary by cable . . ." (Shaterian, op. cit., p. 292).

16 "Whenever the beneficiary stipulates that the obligation of the opening bank shall be also made the obligation of a bank himself, we have what is known as the a confirmed commercial credit and the bank local to the beneficiary becomes the Confirming Bank. In view of the fact that commercial credits issued by American banks in favor of foreign sellers are invariably issued only by . . . larger well known banks, no seller requests that they be confirmed by another bank. The standing of the . . . opening bank is good enough. But many foreign banks are not particularly strong or well known, compared with . . . banks issuing these credit instruments. Indeed, many banks operating abroad are only known through the Banker's Almanac. They serve a useful purpose in their own small communities and perhaps maintain dollars account with the larger . . . banks. But their names are quite meaningless to the . . . . exporter, and when the foreign buyer offers to his . . . seller a credit instrument issued by such a bank, the seller may not receive the protection and other facilities which an instrument issued by a large, strong, and well known bank will give him. To overcome this, he requests that the credit as issued by the local bank of the foreign buyer be confirmed by a well known . . . bank, which will turn out to be (a) . . . bank with which the local bank of the buyer carries a dollar account. The liability of the confirming bank is a primary one and is not contingent in any sense of the word. It is as if the credit were issued by the opening and confirming banks jointly, thus giving the beneficiary or a holder for value of drafts drawn under the credit, the right to proceed against either or both banks, the moment the credit instrument has been breached. The confirming bank receives a commission for its confirmation from the opening bank which the opening bank, in turn, passes on to the buyer of the merchandise" (Shaterian, op. cit., pp. 294-295).

17 "The Paying Bank is the bank on which the drafts are to be drawn. It may be the opening bank, it may be a bank other than the opening bank and not inn the city of the beneficiary, or it may be a bank in the city of the beneficiary, usually the advising bank. If the beneficiary is to draw and receive payment in his own currency, the notifying bank will be indicated as the paying bank also. When the draft is to be paid in this manner, the paying bank assumes no responsibility but merely pays the beneficiary and debits the payment immediately to the account which the opening bank has with it. If the opening bank maintains no account with the paying bank, the paying bank reimburses itself by drawing a bill of exchange on the opening bank, in dollars, for the equivalent of the local currency paid to the beneficiary, at its buying rate for dollar exchange. The beneficiary is entirely out of the transaction because his draft is completely discharged by payment, and the credit arrangement between the paying bank and the opening bank does not concern him" (Shaterian, op. cit., pp. 293-294).

18 "If the draft contemplated by the credit instrument is to be drawn on the opening bank or on another designated bank not in the city of the seller, any bank in the city of the seller which buys or discounts the draft of the beneficiary becomes a Negotiating Bank. As a rule, whenever the facilities of a notifying bank are used, the beneficiary is apt to offer his drafts to the notifying bank for negotiation, thus giving the notifying bank the character of a negotiating bank also. By negotiating the beneficiary's drafts, the negotiating bank becomes "an endorser and bona fide holder" of the drafts and within the protection of the credit instrument. It is also protected by the drawer's a signature, as the drawer's contingent liability, as drawer, continues until discharged by the actual payment of the bills of exchange" (Shaterian, op. cit., p. 293).

19 G.R. No. 94209, prom. 30 April 1991; 196 SCRA 576.

20 "The Uniform Customs and Practices for documentary credits were first published in 1933. The current version was adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce Council in 1983 and published as Publication No. 400 in July of that year. This current version has the blessing of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The Uniform Customs and Practices are not 'law' because of the act of any legislature or court, but because they have been explicitly and implicitly made part of the contract of letters of credit. . . . [M]any of the letters of credit in the United States are governed by the Uniform Custom and Practices and not by the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code) . . .

"In general, the UCP is much more detailed than the UCC. It clearly shows the tracks of many bankers and bank lawyers walking back and forth across its surface . . .

"Every lawyer who deals at any time with a letter of credit should have read the UVCP at least once. The lawyer who deals routinely with such letters or who advises a bank or beneficiary in a circumstance where litigation is threatened or commenced should look more closely at the UCP." (White and Summers, op. cit., pp. 881-883).

21 No. L-24821, 16 October 1970; 35 SCRA 256.

22 See Feati Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 576.

23 76 SCRA 61; see also Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 300; Macenas vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 83; Sociedad Europea de Financiacion vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 105; Lianga Lumber Co. vs. Lianga Timber Co., Inc. 76 SCRA 223.

24 Exh. "C," Records, p. 17.

25 "The banks involved charge a modest commission for their various services. The higher the risk that the bank assumes, the higher the commission (e.g., to confirm an L/C is riskier than merely transmitting an advise of credit) (Jackson and Davey, op. cit., p. 53).

26 See Art. 1878 (9) and (11) of the Civil Code, respectively, provides that a special power of attorney is required "[T]o bind the principal to render some service without compensation" and "[T]o obligate the principal as a guarantor or surety." Art. 1887 states that "the agent shall act in accordance with the instructions of the principal". Moreover, Art. 1888 enjoins the agent from carrying out "an agency if its execution would manifestly result in loss or damage to the principal."

27 In fact, Inter-Resin's pro forma invoice (Exh. "A") sent to General Chemicals, on the basis of which the letter of credit was apparently issued, demanded for a confirmed and irrevocable letter of credit.

28 The suspicion that no contract of sale was perfected between Inter-Resin and General Chemicals may find support in the absence of a written memorandum of the sale or any other document showing that General Chemicals ordered the goods, and the Comment of Inter-Resin detailing the material events of this case but, surprisingly, failed to categorically state or show that such contract was consented to by the parties.

29 Article 8 of U.C.P. states : "A credit may be advised to a beneficiary through another bank (the advising bank) without engagement on the part of the advising bank, but that bank shall take reasonable care to check the apparent authenticity of the credit which it advises. (Revised 1983, ICC No. 400; reproduced in Jackson and Davey, op. cit., p. 54); TSN, 13 May 1982, Darley Wijiesekara on cross-examination.

30 1983 ed., p. 96.

31 See Shaterian, op. cit., p. 293.

32 In this respect, its belated theory before us and its motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision should be rejected for being iniquitous under the circumstances. In fact, Bank of America has failed to present the draft and, more substantially, Inter-Resin has not been afforded full opportunity to refute by evidence this new argument of Bank of America. In short, we find the records insufficient to arrive at a just determination on this fact that can allow us to apply the Negotiable Instruments Law thereon.

33 Philip W. Thayer, "Irrevocable Credits on International Commerce: Their Legal Effects," Columbia Law Review (1937), vol. 37, pp. 1357-1358.

34 "Both in the application form for import credits and in the regulations governing our export credits, it is definitely provided that the banks involved shall not be made responsible for the genuineness of the documents submitted under commercial credits. If the buyer of merchandise has sufficient confidence in the integrity of the seller against shipping documents to be tendered to the bank by the seller, as provided by the credit instrument, it follows that the same confidence should extend to the tendering of genuine documents. If the seller is dishonest, he need not attempt to defraud the buyer by the tender of forged documents. he can obtain the desired evil end with less opportunity for prompt detection by shipping inferior goods or no goods at all. The carrier does not pry into the cases and packages to make sure that the merchandise is, in fact, as described in the bill of lading and invoices which are prepared by the shipper. The tender of forged documents for the purpose of obtaining money is a crime and the seller who commits such crime is prosecuted and jailed.

". . . Neither can the interested banks assume responsibility for the character or quality of the goods shipped nor for the terms of the sale contract not incorporated and made part of the credit instrument. How could they? While the parties to the sale contract may be experts as to the involved merchandise the banks are not, generally speaking, sufficiently versed in the fine points of each and every class of merchandise which they finance. Even assuming the bank has men in its employ who can qualify as experts in certain lines of merchandising, it would not wish to extend this sort of service without adequate compensation but such service is not a banking function.

". . . Because of this credit should describe the goods in general terms only and the buyer should trust that the seller will ship the exact merchandise ordered. If the buyer is not satisfied with the moral standing of the seller, he should not open the credit but buy on open account basis, or subject the draft terms with the additional requirement that the draft need not be paid until after the buyer has had an opportunity to examine the gods to make sure that he has received exactly what he ordered" (Shaterian, op. cit., pp. 352-354).